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COOPERATIVE PATENT PROSECUTION:  
VIEWING PATENTS THROUGH A 
PRAGMATICS LENS 
KRISTEN OSENGA†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Conversation is easy.  We converse with other people daily.  
Some of the communications are oral, occurring face-to-face or 
over the telephone.  Other conversations occur over a chain of e-
mails or in real time, using instant messaging or chat room 
technology.  Sometimes the content of conversation is important 
and informative.  Conversations can propel business deals, peace 
negotiations, or medical decisions.  But other times the content is 
not important at all; it may be mundane or even banal.  Small 
talk about the weather, the stock market, or local sports teams is 
less about content and more about the social relationships it 
helps develop and maintain.  Regardless of its purpose and 
regardless of its style, we use language to converse all the time 
without much ado.  
Patent law, by contrast, is hard.  The task of claim 
construction—interpreting the words that patents use to 
delineate the boundaries of the patentees’ exclusive rights1
 
† Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I particularly 
appreciate the law and language insights provided by Peter Tiersma, as well as the 
thoughtful and detailed comments received from John Carroll, Kevin Collins, Jessica 
Erickson, Jim Gibson, Timothy Holbrook, Corinna Lain, Michael Risch, and David 
Schwartz. This Article also benefits from comments received at the 2009 IP 
Roundtable at Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; the 2008 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford University; the Fall 2008 
Virginia Junior Faculty Forum; and at a New Scholars panel of the 2008 
Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) annual meeting. I am also 
grateful for the research assistance of Justin Sheldon, Heather Walczak, and Randa 
Zakhour.  
—is 
1 See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (“It is the claim that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled 
to the protection of the patent system.”); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim 
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2000). 
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one of the most important aspects of patent law but also one of 
the most difficult.  Judges have called claim construction “a 
special occupation,”2 “a mongrel practice,”3 even “impossible,”4 
and for good reason.  Interpretation of the terms used in a patent 
remains basically a crap-shoot, with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversing trial court claim 
construction determinations in 33% to 50% of patent cases.5  It is 
little wonder that claim construction has drawn much criticism 
from scholars.6
So why is there so much ado about claim construction?  Some 
say that claim construction is hard because the information 
conveyed by the words is of great consequence.  But this alone 
cannot explain why claim construction is the subject of so much 
discussion; there is an awful lot of important information 
conveyed in everyday conversation as well, but without all of the 
  Claim construction may well be the most difficult 
and misunderstood aspect of patent law. 
 
2 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“Patent 
construction in particular ‘is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special 
training and practice.’ ” (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1849))). 
3 Id. at 378. 
4 Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1959) 
(“There is no question but what the claims are complex and drafted with language 
and in a style that makes them difficult if not impossible for laymen—and indeed, 
for most lawyers and judges—to understand.”). 
5 The Federal Circuit is the appellate court with primary responsibility for 
patent cases. Various empirical studies have calculated that Federal Circuit reversal 
rates based on claim construction errors are between 30% and 50%. See, e.g., Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that reversal rates were “hovering near 50%” for cases 
decided in 1995 through 1997); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges 
Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2, 4 (2001) (finding a 
reversal rate of 33% over the time period 1996 to 2000); Christian A. Chu, Note, 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1092, 1098 (2001) (finding a reversal rate of 47.3% over the time 
period January 1, 1998 to April 30, 2000). 
6 The number of articles written that criticize claim construction is legion. For 
just a few examples, see John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to 
Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 327 (2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus 
Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 125–
26 (2005); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and 
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1030 (2007); Kelly 
Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 
59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 343 (2007); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An 
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 223, 227 (2008). 
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trouble that accompanies claim construction.  Another 
explanation is that patent claims include scientific jargon that is 
nearly impossible to understand.  But the reality is that, more 
often than not, parties litigate over simple words being used just 
as they would be in everyday conversation.  Words like “a,” “or,” 
“to,” “on,” “about,” “including,” and “through” have been the 
subject of claim construction disputes.7
Despite the significance of language and communication in 
patent law, and law generally, legal scholars have shown 
surprisingly little interest in linguistics—the study of language 
and how we understand it—and even less interest in 
pragmatics—the study of how context enriches content.
  For the most part, 
patents are like everyday conversation, relying on language to 
convey information from one party to another and serving as an 
exchange of information between an inventor, the Patent Office, 
and the public. 
8  This is 
odd, given the importance of interpretation and construction in 
all areas of the law.9  The few scholars that have adopted a 
linguistics-based framework to examine legal communication 
have focused on statutory language and its relation to everyday 
conversation.10
 
7 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005); see also Golden, supra note 6, at 338–39; David 
Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role of Appellate Deference in 
Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. REV. 194, 205 (2006) (“[D]isputed 
claim terms, even for technical patents, are often not terms of art, but rather are 
ordinary English words given their everyday meanings.”). 
  But despite the volumes of scholarly analysis 
devoted to claim construction thus far, no one has considered the  
 
 
 
8 See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Linguistics and the Composition of 
Legal Documents: Border Crossings, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 697, 697 (1998).  
9 For the sake of completeness, there is a difference between interpretation and 
construction in law. Particularly, interpretation is determining the linguistic 
meaning or semantics of a legal text, while construction is translating the 
interpretation into a set of legal rules. These distinctions do have some relevance, 
but in patent law, as well as in this piece, we find the two terms used 
interchangeably. 
10 See Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423 
(2008); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 1179, 1182–83; M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics 
in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 374 (1985). 
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implications of linguistics theory in intellectual property law.11
In particular, by viewing patents as conversations, we can 
take advantage of the rich body of work that has been developed 
in linguistics to understand more clearly the source of 
indeterminacy in patent claim construction.  Various doctrines of 
claim construction make perfect sense when viewed through the 
conversation lens.  And a linguistics-based approach shows us 
that, contrary to mainstream patent literature, the existing 
process for claim construction is actually pretty good.  In fact, 
given linguistic limitations, claim construction is about as good 
as it is going to get.   
  It 
is time to examine patent claim construction through a 
conversational linguistics lens. 
But if it is true that both everyday conversation and patent 
conversation are similar exchanges of information, why is  
claim construction difficult where understanding everyday 
conversation is not?  There is one stark difference between these 
two types of conversation:  Everyday conversation is easy because 
it is the result of a cooperative enterprise, while patent 
conversation is purposefully and pragmatically non-cooperative.  
It is not until we consider the exchange of patent information as 
a conversation and apply a conversational linguistics approach to 
claim construction that we realize the value of this insight:  
Claim construction can only be improved if we can raise the level 
of cooperation in the conversations that result in the grant of a 
patent.  To inject cooperation into the patent prosecution process, 
we need to provide incentives to both the inventor and the Patent 
Office to act cooperatively.  We also need to change patent 
prosecution and claim construction rules to create and benefit 
from a more cooperative atmosphere.  Finally, we need to take 
advantage of this new air of cooperation by institutionalizing the 
 
11 One intellectual property scholar, Joseph Scott Miller, has acknowledged the 
conversational linguistic aspects of the patent document. Miller does not 
contemplate the differences between a patent and ordinary conversation, however; 
rather, he relies on the basic conversation implicature to bolster the need for 
ordinary meaning in the claim construction process. See Joseph Scott Miller, 
Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 177, 189 (2005). Other scholars, such as John R. Thomas, have made the 
observation that the patent acquisition process looks like a conversation but have 
not explored a conversational linguistic approach. See John R. Thomas, On 
Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories 
in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 184 (1999) (calling the patent 
prosecution process a “dialogue”). 
CP_Osenga (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:20 PM 
2011] COOPERATIVE PATENT PROSECUTION 119 
shared background knowledge of the parties to the conversation, 
present by proxy as a person having ordinary skill in the art.  By 
making these changes, we can take advantage of conversational 
linguistic insights to improve the outcome of the existing claim 
construction processes. 
This Article constructs a linguistics-based framework to 
consider claim construction and demonstrates that the often-told 
story that claim construction is broken is, in fact, wrong.  Rather, 
it is the underlying conversations that comprise the patent 
acquisition process that are to blame.  In Part I of this Article, I 
use linguistics to describe the characteristics of everyday 
conversation, as well as how it is interpreted.  In Part II, I 
explain what patent conversations look like and how they are 
similar to and different from everyday conversation.  In Part III, 
I apply the theories of interpreting everyday conversation to 
patent conversation.  Breaking from tradition, I assert that claim 
construction is not broken; much claim construction methodology 
aligns with how we interpret everyday conversation.  Claim 
construction is as good as it can be, given linguistic limitations.  
The problem is the patent conversation itself, specifically the 
communications that occur between the inventor and the Patent 
Office that give rise to an issued patent.  I close, in Part IV, by 
explaining how cooperation can—and should—be injected into 
the patent conversation and how a cooperative patent 
conversation leads to improved claim construction. 
I. EVERYDAY CONVERSATION 
Linguistics scholars have long realized that cooperation is 
the key to communication.12
 
12 See Jens Allwood, Cooperation, Competition, Conflict and Communication 1 
(Gothenburg Papers in Theoretical Linguistics, 2007), available at 
http://www.hprints.org/docs/00/46/04/98/PDF/gupea_2077_21865_1.pdf. 
  It is this cooperation that is lacking 
in patent conversations.  To understand how increasing the level 
of cooperation in patent conversations can lead to better claim 
construction determinations, we first need to examine the 
characteristics of everyday conversation and discuss how 
cooperation adds context to content in interpreting everyday 
speech.  Only then can we apply what we know about everyday 
conversation to patent conversation. 
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A. Characteristics of Everyday Conversation 
At its most basic level, conversation is an exchange between 
a speaker, or sender, of information and a hearer, or receiver, of 
information.13  Conversation relies on language, and there is an 
assumption that both the speaker and the hearer are fluent in 
the language of the exchange.  Although not typically considered 
a “conversation,” everyday writing shares the feature of being an 
exchange of information that relies on language and can be 
viewed as a conversation.14  In everyday conversation, the parties 
may take alternating roles in communicating or acting as the 
speaker; this is known as bilateral conversation.15  When the 
conversation is bilateral, the hearer can clarify any lack of 
understanding by simply asking the speaker.  The hearer, 
however, need not become a speaker for communication to occur.  
When only one party is conveying information, this is known as 
unilateral conversation.16  With this type of communication, the 
speaker’s clarity becomes more important because there is no 
opportunity to seek clarification.  Regardless of whether the 
conversation is unilateral or bilateral, the underlying theme of 
everyday conversation is an assumption that the speaker intends 
to convey some type of information to the hearer, who will 
understand that information is being conveyed.17
To facilitate the exchange of content, the speaker implicitly 
promises to convey information to the hearer that is not already 
known and that is relevant, or at least closely enough related, to 
what the hearer already knows so that the hearer can make a 
   
 
13 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1133 (2003). 
14 See Fajans & Falk, supra note 8, at 718–19. Writing is also subject to the 
same concerns discussed below:  
Because writing is a communicative act, a writer must assess the 
audience’s knowledge and inferencing capacities and supply what the 
audience needs to decode or discern the text’s purpose and meaning. This 
suggests that no text is sufficient unto itself; all texts rely on a reader’s 
extra-textual knowledge, knowledge that helps the reader process the text. 
Id. at 718. 
15 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 184 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “bilateral” as 
“[a]ffecting or obligating both parties”). 
16 See id. at 1671 (defining “unilateral” as “[o]ne sided; relating to only one of 
two or more persons or things”). 
17 DAN SPERBER & DIERDRE WILSON, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION 116 (2d ed. 
1995). Whether or not he actually understands the information conveyed depends on 
many factors, including the skill of the speaker in conveying it. 
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connection.18  Of course, this is not strictly true.  As mentioned 
above, conversation is sometimes not informative or is 
informative but irrelevant; these types of conversation are useful 
to create or maintain social relationships.19  However, the hearer 
generally expects that the speaker will be “informative, truthful, 
relevant, clear, unambiguous, brief, and orderly.”20  This mutual 
pairing of guarantee and expectation allows for efficient 
conversation, ideally free of ambiguity and missing pieces.21  It 
also means that it should be apparent to the parties when the 
information intended to be conveyed differs from the speech’s 
semantic content, in other words, the plain meaning of the words 
of the utterance.22
These cooperative ideals further shape other characteristics 
of everyday conversation.  Conversations can occur between any 
two or more parties.  To succeed in the goal of conveying 
information, the speaker’s style may vary based on the 
composition of the audience.  In every conversation, members of 
the audience can be classified into four categories: addressees, 
auditors, overhearers, and eavesdroppers.
  Everyday conversation is thus cooperative 
because the speaker and the hearer share an expectation that 
full and accurate information is being conveyed. 
23  An addressee is 
intended to hear the speaker’s utterance.24  An auditor is known 
by the speaker to be listening and the auditor’s presence is 
ratified, or accepted, by the speaker; he is not, however, the 
target of the speaker’s utterance.25  An overhearer is known to be 
listening, but the overhearer’s presence is not ratified.26
 
18 See Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in 
Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 346 (2004) (quoting STEVEN 
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 228 (1994)). 
  Finally, 
19 See JAMES R. HURFORD, BRENDAN HEASLEY, MICHAEL B. SMITH, SEMANTICS: 
A COURSEBOOK 4–5 (2d ed. 2008). 
20 See McGreal, supra note 18 (quoting PINKER, supra note 18). 
21 See id. at 345 (“Cooperation is not simply a matter of style, making 
conversation more concise; it makes communication more efficient by increasing a 
speaker’s speed and clarity. Speed affects a conversation’s cost because, as 
economists know, time is money.”). 
22 See Marmor, supra note 10, at 428 (“A speaker would normally succeed in 
conveying assertive content that differs from what he says, when it would be obvious 
to the hearer, in the particular context of the conversation, that it just cannot be the 
case that the speaker asserts exactly what he says.”). 
23 See Smith, supra note 13, at 1134. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
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the speaker is unaware of the listening by an eavesdropper.27
Aside from the idea of different categories of hearers, other 
aspects about the composition of the audience help the speaker 
choose how to convey information.  For example, a speaker may 
use an alternate tone or even different word choices when talking 
to adult addressees versus child addressees.  To an adult, the 
speaker may simply say “This place is a mess!” whereas to a 
child, the speaker may need to succinctly spell out that the child 
needs to tidy the room, and soon. 
  
Based on the composition of the audience and the content of 
information, a speaker may wish to convey information so that it 
is made available to all hearers.  In other cases, the speaker, 
knowing the audience, may adjust the content to target only the 
addressee.  For example, if a speaker is trying to convey that ice 
cream may be available after dinner to an adult addressee in the 
presence of a child auditor—or perhaps overhearer, as children 
go—the speaker may be purposefully more abstruse and indirect 
in conveying the information so as not to excite the child who has 
not yet finished his entrée. 
Conversations occur in any number of places and at any 
number of times.  These factors can also affect the characteristics 
of a conversation.  The content may differ based on whether the 
conversation is formal or informal.  Formal situations generally 
call for more reliance on content and less reliance on context by 
using more nouns and fewer pronouns, leaving less to the 
hearer’s interpretation and imagination.28  Formal situations also 
are more likely to extend beyond the two-party, familiar 
conversation and to include additional parties, such as 
overhearers and eavesdroppers.29  Because the speaker may be 
less informed about the audience composition, the amount of 
content required to convey the information may increase to 
compensate for a lack of certainty about the background 
knowledge shared with the audience.30
 
27 See id. 
  Finally, formal 
28 See id. at 1135. As an aside, some languages, like Spanish, have entirely 
separate verb conjugation forms for formal circumstances versus informal. For 
example, consider the conjugation of “hablar” or “to speak”; the phrase “you speak” is 
rendered “tú hablas” in the familiar and “usted habla” in more formal conversation. 
29 See id. at 1113. 
30 See id. at 1136 (“[S]peakers are more explicit in more anonymous, 
communicative settings.”). This need for extra explicit speech comes at a cost to the 
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conversations are more likely than informal conversations to be 
unilateral, again imposing a need for additional content in the 
absence of the ability to seek clarification.31  As will be described 
below,32 conversations in patent law share many of the 
characteristics of formal conversation.33
B. How We Interpret Everyday Conversation 
 
Part of the appeal of using everyday conversation as a 
framework for examining claim construction in patent law is its 
simplicity.  We generally understand these conversations without 
thinking much about them.  In fact, we communicate with words 
without explicitly defining the words or adhering to rigid rules as 
to their usage—yet, communication occurs and the hearer 
understands.34  As noted above, the content conveyed by 
conversation is enhanced by context; together, content and 
context create the meaning.35
Although participants to everyday conversation may not give 
much thought to the process of communication, there is a field of 
study—linguistics—that is concerned with all aspects of 
language, ranging from how sounds are formed, to what words 
mean, to how words are grouped together to convey ideas.
 
36  The 
branch of linguistics that most informs our understanding of 
everyday conversation is pragmatics.37  Pragmatics includes the 
study of how “utterances”38
 
speaker, who is required to choose his words more carefully and cannot rely on any 
extra-speech signals. See id. at 1136–37. 
 become communication and, in 
31 See id. at 1149. 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 Patent conversation tends to be written, whereas everyday conversation can 
be either oral or written. However, the study of linguistics is appropriate in both 
cases because at bottom we are dealing with a question of language. As linguist 
Leonard Bloomfield remarked, “writing is not language, but merely a way of 
recording language by means of visible marks.” LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE 
21 (1933). Thus, the application of linguistic concepts to patent conversation is as 
apt as applying linguistics to everyday conversation. 
34 See McGreal, supra note 18, at 334. 
35 See supra Part I.A. 
36 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 61, 84–85 (2006). 
37 See Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics (Nov. 28, 2006). 
38 See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 16–17 (defining an 
“utterance” as a stretch of talk preceded and followed by silence, compared to a 
“sentence” or string of words put together following the rules of grammar). 
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particular, how context surrounding an utterance provides 
additional content.  Specifically, pragmatics differentiates “what 
words mean, what the speaker literally says when using them, 
and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using 
those words, which often goes considerably beyond what is 
said.”39
1. Understanding Content 
   
Content in conversation comes from the words used and how 
they are put together.  Word meanings can be expressed in two 
ways, by referent or by sense.40  The referent of a particular 
expression is the thing or person to which it refers; you say the 
word “dog” and point to a terrier sitting on the floor next to you.41  
The sense of a particular expression, in contrast, is an 
abstraction, not a physical thing that can be pointed to.42  
Dictionaries are full of words or expressions that have the same 
sense.43
 
39 Korta & Perry, supra note 37. However, the field of near-sided pragmatics 
does have relevance in patent interpretation. See GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS 
AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 1 (2d ed. 1996) (“Pragmatics is the study 
of the mechanisms that [allow us to] use the term communicate interchangeably 
with speak or write, never noticing that the term communication presupposes 
achievement of the intended effect of verbal action upon the addressee, while 
speaking and writing do not. . . . Communication is, rather, the successful 
interpretation by an addressee of a speaker’s intent in performing a linguistic act.”); 
Paul F. Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
275, 297 (2001) (“Communication is an act, and it is an act motivated by an intention 
to produce certain beliefs in an audience . . . . Meaning is thus a function of [the 
utterer’s] intention and the belief in [the audience] that [the utterer] seeks to 
produce.”).  
  This means that the word “dog” in the dictionary does 
not refer to a particular terrier nor to any other breed of dog 
sitting on the floor next to you; it simply points in the direction of 
other words that mean the same thing, such as “canine.”  While 
dictionaries help to understand the meanings of words, they 
cannot be used in the first instance—for example, an English 
dictionary cannot be used to help a non-native speaker learn his 
first English word—because expressions are defined via other 
40 See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 26; Kevin Emerson 
Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing 
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 541 (2008). 
41 See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 31. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 32. 
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expressions of the same sense or abstraction.44  Telling a non-
native speaker that a “dog” is a “canine” is not helpful.45  When 
interpreting the content of everyday conversation, it is safe to 
assume that competent speakers and hearers of the language 
know what is meant, at least generally.46  Once a hearer has a 
critical mass of understanding about the stable meaning of words 
in a language, the hearer can quickly grasp different 
conversational and social uses of the same words.47
It is tempting to think that content alone is all that is 
required for communication.  Admittedly there is a certain 
appeal to taking words at face value or following the “plain text” 
movement of interpretation, if you will.  The adage “[s]ay what 
you mean and mean what you say” has appeared in various 
forms and fora, ranging from a dialog in Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland
   
48 to quotations from Dr. Seuss49 and General George 
S. Patton,50
 
44 See id. 
 not to mention as an exhortation from parents and 
teachers over the years.  If we could simply rely on the content 
conveyed in the utterance itself, the interpretive process would 
be greatly streamlined.  Unfortunately, the benefits of an 
economical interpretive methodology, such as plain text, are 
outweighed by the additional content that can be derived from 
context.  In short, context is required. 
45 This is true unless, of course, the non-native speaker is fluent in Latin. 
46 See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 7. 
47 See id. at 6. 
48 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 62 (Delacorte 
Press/Seymour Lawrence 1977) (1865). 
“Then you should say what you mean,” the March Hare went on. 
“I do,” Alice hastily replied; “at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s 
the same thing, you know.” 
“Not the same thing a bit!” said the Hatter. “Why, you might just as well 
say that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see’!” 
Id. 
49 Although the quote “Say what you mean and mean what you say, because 
those who mind don’t matter and those who matter don’t mind,” appears in multiple 
places on the Internet attributed to Dr. Seuss, it is possible that the quote is actually 
a conflation of two quotes by Dr. Seuss—“I meant what I said and I said what I 
meant” from Horton Hatches an Egg and “Be who you are and say what you feel, 
because those who mind don’t matter and those who matter don’t mind,” attributed 
generally to Dr. Seuss. See Dr. Seuss Quotes, THE QUOTATIONS PAGE, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Dr._Seuss/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).  
50 See Quotations by General George S. Patton, http://www.generalpatton.com/ 
quotes.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (“Say what you mean and mean what you 
say.”). 
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2. Understanding Context 
In everyday conversation, the content, or information 
communicated, is based not only on the words used, but also on 
context.  Consider an example:  A wounded woman asks an 
emergency room physician if she is going to die.51  The doctor 
responds simply, “you are not going to die.”52  Despite the doctor’s 
response, there is no reason to question our ideas about 
mortality.  Although the plain meaning of the utterance would 
suggest otherwise, the content conveyed by the conversation is 
not that the patient is immortal but rather that she will not die 
from her current wounds.53
Context also enriches ordinary conversation where the same 
responsive utterance may be intended to mean various things in 
different situations.
  This is an instance where context 
provides additional, and perhaps more important, data to the 
words actually used.  The context of the situation, plus the 
speaker’s and hearer’s shared knowledge that no one lives 
forever, enhance the content of the utterance and provide a 
richer, more accurate meaning for the information conveyed. 
54  For example, if a man is asked if he has 
two children and he responds “yes,” the understanding is that he 
has exactly two children, no more and no less.55  Yet, if a man is 
asked if he has two beers in his refrigerator and he responds 
“yes,” the likely information intended to be conveyed is that he 
has at least two beers and perhaps more.56
 
51 See Marmor, supra note 10, at 426. 
  The extra content 
conveyed by context in these examples is more subtle, yet it  
 
52 See id. Marmor also provides a similar example of a bartender who tells a 
teenager that he “must be 21 years old to drink.” Id. The speaker and the hearer 
understand that you need to be 21 or older to drink, not precisely 21. See id. The 
context of the dialogue, that speaker and hearer are in a bar, adds the detail that it 
is likely alcohol and not apple juice that can only be drank by persons 21 or older. 
See id. 
53 See id. 
54 These examples, and others highlighting how conversational context enhances 
meaning, are found in Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What is 
Not, Special About the Law, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 403, 411 (2009). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. (“ ‘Exactly,’ ‘at least’ . . . —these are additions to what is asserted, 
generated by special features of the context of utterance, over and above [the words 
themselves]. In all these cases, what is communicated isn’t the semantic content of 
the sentence uttered, but something richer, to which meaning and obvious 
background assumptions have both contributed.”). 
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shows that context and shared understanding can only be 
ignored at the risk of not fully understanding the meaning of the 
utterance. 
Although context can be derived from a variety of sources, 
one place that context can be found is in the “conversation” itself, 
or the dialog that occurs between the speaker and the hearer.  
Looking carefully at a conversation, we learn “an important truth 
about ordinary speech”:  Speakers in everyday conversation leave 
much unsaid, depending on context to carry the intended 
meaning.57  Despite the amount of unspoken content, everyday 
conversation goes on, relatively, without a hitch.  This is because 
speakers rely on information that can be implied or derived from 
the circumstances surrounding the conversation—who is 
participating, when the conversation occurs, where the 
conversation occurs, and so on—as well as information present in 
the speaker’s and hearer’s shared background.58
Linguist and philosopher H. Paul Grice examined 
conversation-based context, focusing in part on the meaning 
intended by the speaker, the linguistic meaning of the utterance 
itself, and the interrelations between these two meanings.
  These 
implications allow for a much more detailed understanding of the 
content being conveyed.   
59
 
57 McGreal, supra note 18, at 325–26. 
  In 
particular, he analyzed conversation, observing that everyday 
exchanges are typically about a topic known to the participants, 
about which they have shared general knowledge to which the 
conversation adds, and which refines the shared general 
58 See id. at 325. Because speakers and hearers have expectations about the 
content of everyday conversation, the fact that much is left unsaid does not cause 
problems, as discussed below. See id. at 346 (“These expectations help to winnow out 
the inappropriate readings of an ambiguous sentence, to piece together fractured 
utterances, to excuse slips of the tongue, to guess the referents of pronouns and 
descriptions, and to fill in the missing steps of an argument.” (quoting PINKER, supra 
note 18, at 228–29)). 
59 See Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grice/ (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., last updated Mar. 23, 2009). 
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knowledge.60  Grice termed the enhanced meaning provided by 
the context of the exchange “conversational implicature.”61
Conversational implicature makes it possible to derive 
additional information above and beyond the content of the 
utterances.
  
62  Consider an example:  Man X is standing near his 
car on the side of a road.  It is evident that the car has run out of 
gas.  He asks for help from woman Y, a local person who passes 
by.  Y says to X, “There is a gas station in the next town.”63  
While Y has not actually said she knows that the station is open, 
is the closest station, and has gas to sell, it can be implied from 
the conversation that this is information that Y intended to 
convey.64
Grice begins his explanation of conversational implicature 
with the initial premise that everyday conversation is a 
cooperative enterprise.
  This makes sense to us as regular participants in 
everyday conversation, but how does conversational implicature 
work? 
65  In its idealized form, the speaker  
abides by the following principle:  “Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged.”66  Others have recast this theme to 
reflect more clearly that conversation is intended to convey 
information from speaker to hearer:  “[A]gents will not speak 
obscurely in attempting to communicate.”67  Cooperation is 
required for efficient, not to mention successful, conversation.68
 
60 See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 384–85; see also Paul Grice, Logic and 
Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22, 29 (1991) (referring to ideal 
cooperative conversations as those in which the participants “have some common 
immediate aim,” the participants’ contributions should be “dovetailed, mutually 
dependent,” and the “transaction should continue in appropriate style”). 
   
61 Wayne Davis, Implicature, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature (last updated Sept. 22, 2010). 
62 Paul Grice, Presupposition and Conversational Implicature, in RADICAL 
PRAGMATICS 183, 184–85 (Peter Cole ed., 1981). 
63 Grice provides this example in more continental terms, such as “petrol” and 
“garage,” but the gist of the exchange remains the same. See Grice, supra note 60, at 
32.  
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 26.  
66 Id. 
67 See Miller, supra note 11, at 189–90 n.62 (citing GEORGIA M. GREEN, 
PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 91 (2d ed. 1996)). 
68 McGreal, supra note 18, at 343. 
The efficiency . . . depends on the participants’ sharing a lot of background 
knowledge about the events and about the psychology of human behavior. 
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From the general principle of cooperation, Grice develops 
conversational implicature by devising four categories of maxims 
related to everyday conversation: quantity, quality, relation,  
and manner.69  Under the maxim of quantity, a speaker’s 
contributions should be as informative as required for the 
current purposes of the conversation but should not provide too 
much, or extraneous, information.70  The maxim of quality 
discourages the speaker from making statements that the 
speaker believes to be false or for which he lacks adequate 
evidence or knowledge.71  The maxim of relation simply requires 
that the speaker strive to be relevant.72  Finally, the maxim of 
manner is related to form, rather than substance; the speaker 
should avoid obscure expressions, ambiguity, verbosity, and 
disorder.73
Speakers are, of course, not bound by these maxims; in fact, 
the guidelines may even conflict at times.
  
74  But, in the complete 
absence of these ideals, conversation would fail.75  If instead we 
can assume that the speaker is acting in accord with the general 
principle of cooperation and the maxims that flow from it, we can 
also make inferences that extend beyond the semantic content 
imparted by the words alone.76
 
They must use this knowledge to cross-reference the names, pronouns, and 
descriptions with a single cast of characters, and to fill in the logical steps 
that connect each sentence with the next. If background assumptions are 
not shared—for example, if one’s conversational partner is from a very 
different culture, or is schizophrenic, or is a machine—then the best 
parsing [of grammar] in the world will fail to deliver the full meaning of a 
sentence. 
  There is content above and 
Id. (quoting PINKER, supra note 18, at 227) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
69 See Grice, supra note 60, at 26. 
70 See id. at 26–27. 
71 See id. at 27. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. The maxim of manner is, not surprisingly, the most often violated. See 
Sinclair, supra note 10, at 380. 
74 See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 382. This is a unique feature of pragmatics. In 
contrast, consider syntax (grammar rules) or semantics (word definitions). If a 
speaker violates rules of syntax or semantics, the speaker will fail to communicate 
anything. Absent English syntax, the speaker is not speaking English. See id. at 
383. Further, while the rules of pragmatics, or Grice’s maxims, should be violated in 
certain contexts—for example, in the event of cross-examination in a courtroom, the 
maxim of quantity is often a deliberate casualty—the rules of syntax and semantics 
cannot be. See id. at 383–85. 
75 See id. at 382. 
76 See id. at 380–81. 
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beyond the utterance that can be derived from the fact that the 
speaker used these particular words and used them at this point 
in the conversation.77
Grice provides a number of illustrations where 
conversational implicature provides additional information.  
Consider two people talking about a mutual friend who has 
recently gotten a job in a bank.  One person asks the other how 
the friend likes his new job, and the other person replies, “Oh 
quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to 
prison yet.”
  
78  This may seem like an unusual remark, but it 
illuminates far more information than what is conveyed by the 
utterance.79  It appears that the second person is communicating 
to the first that their mutual friend is potentially dishonest.80  
The first person may be aware of this peculiar quality in the 
friend; if not, he is entitled to ask the second person exactly what 
is meant.81  If the friend were known by both people to be an 
honest person, then the second person’s remark would have 
violated the maxim of relevance or perhaps quality.82  But if we 
assume that the speech follows the maxims, we arrive at the 
implicature that the second person’s remark refers to the mutual 
friend’s dishonesty.83
Consider again the example of the man X who has run out of 
gas and the passerby Y who states, “There is a gas station in the 
next town.”
 
84  If Y is observing the maxims of conversation, it 
then follows that Y intends to convey that the station is indeed 
open, is the nearest station, and will sell gas.85
Consider a final, and more nuanced, example:  Two persons, 
A and B, are planning a trip to France, where A hopes to visit a 
third person, C.
  If Y does not 
intend to convey this, her utterance violates the maxims of 
relevance and quality. 
86
 
77 See id. at 381. 
  If A asks B, “Where does C live,” and B replies, 
“Somewhere in the South of France,” then we—and A—can 
78 Grice, supra note 60, at 24. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 32.  
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
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deduce that B may not know exactly where C lives.87  If B knew 
more precisely where C lived, B would be required by the maxim 
of quantity to indicate as much.88  If B did not know but had 
simply guessed where C lived, B would have violated the maxim 
of quality.89  Thus, the conversational implicature, assuming B is 
following the maxims, is that B does not know precisely where C 
lives.90
In each of these examples, the information exchanged in the 
actual utterances is incomplete.  Yet because of conversational 
implicature, we are able to comprehend the meaning as intended 
by the speaker.  There are times in patent law where the 
information exchanged may be similarly lacking.  Patent 
conversations, by contrast, are not cooperative; therefore we are 
generally unable to apply conversational implicature in the same 
way to achieve a comprehensive understanding.  This insight will 
be helpful in later examining patent conversation. 
   
In addition to conversational implicature as described above, 
there are other examples of information left unsaid in everyday 
conversation.  For example, what was once a conversational 
implicature has been used so frequently that the utterance has 
become an idiomatic expression, where the utterance takes on a 
common meaning that exists even absent the cooperative nature 
of the conversation.91  One instance of this is the commonly used 
phrase, “Do you have the time?”92
In a nutshell, context is absolutely necessary to ensure 
appropriate interpretation.  Reliance on abstract, semantic, or 
out-of-context meanings of the words of an utterance will 
undoubtedly lead to frequent erroneous interpretations.
  Unless the respondent is being 
sarcastic, the answer to this question is not “yes” but rather, the 
current time.  And yet, the content of the question as uttered can 
be faithfully answered in the affirmative.  The longstanding use 
of this question, however, has made it so that the phrase has a 
meaning independent of context and shared background 
knowledge. 
93
 
87 See id. at 32–33. 
  
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Marmor, supra note 10, at 433. 
92 Id. 
93 See Kirgis, supra note 39, at 292–93 (“[L]inguistic meaning’s promise of 
simplified, objective interpretations is illusory.”). 
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Ambiguity and vagueness complicate interpretation, particularly 
because words often have more than one definition; in fact, even 
the rare word that only has one meaning can acquire additional 
non-standard meanings based on context.94  Stability of meaning 
may also affect interpretation of an utterance; even in the same 
situational context, definitions of words change by region, by 
time, and by individual.  Finally, the simplicity of the semantic 
meaning—the interpretation of utterances without looking to 
context—does not avoid searching for a speaker’s intent.  
Instead, as others have argued, the plain text/utterance inquiry 
merely relocates the question of intent to some other aspect of 
the analysis.95
On the flipside, interpretation based on context has often 
been criticized as inefficient at best or result driven at worst.  
Yet, the alternative is similarly unattractive:  Where an 
utterance is taken without context, the hearer is left to simply 
“invent” a context to understand what is being said.
   
96  Whether 
or not we admit that we are using context, language 
interpretation necessarily entails its use.97  We need to consider 
the context of the utterance; it is not enough to consider simply 
the semantics or mere words being used.98
The key insight for the purposes of this Article is not the 
development of the conversational implicature.  The interesting 
thing is how the underlying premise of cooperation leads to the 
implicature that quite naturally shapes our understanding of 
everyday conversation.  We do not consciously apply the maxims.  
Everyday conversation results in successful communication not 
because of conscious efforts to be relevant or to only state as 
 
 
94 Consider the term “cookie”: For much of time, this word had a single stable 
meaning, that of a sweet treat. However, the term has taken on a secondary, non-
standard meaning in the Internet context as a small piece of data left on a computer 
by a web browser. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer 
and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189, 207 
(1986) (“Even words which have only one dictionary meaning can develop other 
meanings through metaphorical extension. At the other extreme, a word such as 
‘right’ has a large variety of dictionary meanings. Context will usually allow the 
hearer to extrapolate the intended meaning.”). 
95 See Kirgis, supra note 39, at 292. 
96 See McGreal, supra note 18, at 338. 
97 See id. 
98 See Marmor, supra note 10, at 423 (“It has been long noticed by linguists and 
philosophers of language, however, that the content of linguistic communication is 
not always fully determined by the meaning of the words and sentences uttered.”). 
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much information as we know to be true but because of the 
underlying tenet of cooperation.  What if cooperation became an 
integral part of the patent conversation?  Would understanding 
patent conversation be more like everyday conversation?  
Remember, everyday conversation is easy.   
II. PATENT AS CONVERSATION 
Understanding patents is hard.  Describing a new invention 
with old words cannot be easy.  Ambiguity and indeterminacy 
may seem inevitable.  But perhaps, if we draw on what we know 
about everyday conversation, we can gain insight about how to 
better understand patents.  This is not too much of a stretch.  
Even though everyday conversation is often vocal, while patent 
conversation is generally non-vocal, both are verbal 
communications in that they rely on language to exchange 
information.99  While it is assumed, as it is in everyday 
conversation, that the parties to patent conversations speak the 
same language,100 these conversations generally impose a  
higher level of presumed fluency on participants because patents 
include a mix of technical and legal information, often 
inseparably intertwined.101  This presumption of heightened 
fluency is manifest in the axiom that patent conversations are to 
be interpreted objectively from the viewpoint of a “person having 
ordinary skill in the art,” or “PHOSITA.”102
 
99 The conversations that give rise to the patent itself and the patent document 
both rely primarily on language. The content of a patent may be supplemented with 
drawings or diagrams to clarify the written words. See 35 U.S.C. § 113 (2006) 
(requiring drawings whenever necessary to understand the invention). 
  Additionally, patent 
100 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b), (d) (2011) (requiring patent applications to be in the 
English language or accompanied by an English translation of the patent 
application); Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and 
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 891 
(2005). 
101 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996); see 
also Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 160 (2006) 
(noting that the Federal Circuit “has shifted the patent from being a technical 
document to a legal one”). 
102 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 
Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 877, 881 (2002) (“[The] plain language should be interpreted not from the 
perspective of the ordinary speaker of English but, rather, from the vantage point of 
a ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ (‘PHOSITA’).”). 
It is not just any “art” that the PHOSITA is skilled in; rather, he must be skilled in 
the “relevant technological art” of the invention. See Golden, supra note 6, at 326 
(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14). 
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conversations, like everyday conversations, are typically confined 
to a single topic.  Claims in a patent, in fact, are required to be 
limited to a single invention103
There are at least two exchanges of information in patent 
law that can be justifiably analogized to everyday conversation.  
First, in the patent acquisition process, there is a series of 
communications between the inventor and the Patent Office, 
known as “prosecution,” during which the Patent Office 
determines whether and to what extent the invention merits 
granting the inventor a limited monopoly.
 and in this way may be closer to 
ideal conversation.  
104  Second, after the 
patent and its accompanying monopoly is granted, the patent 
document itself has the daunting task of conveying information 
about the scope of the patent holder’s territory of exclusion to a 
diverse audience including competitors, attorneys, judges, 
venture capitalists, and in some respects the general public.105
Construction of terms used in patent claims is implicated in 
both the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
during acquisition and the conversation between the patent and 
the public post-grant.  However, there are distinctions that 
require addressing additional characteristics of each type of 
patent conversation separately. 
 
 
103 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006) (allowing the Patent Office to require 
multiple applications to be filed if the application includes multiple independent and 
distinct inventions); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18, 19 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 
(“Two or more independent inventions can not be claimed in one application.”). 
104 See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and 
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 70–71 (2003). The 
purpose of the claims is to delineate the extent of the patent’s scope, which must be 
determined both prior to the grant of the patent over the invention as well as post-
grant to evaluate the patent’s validity and infringement of the patent. See, e.g., 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2005) (describing how the scope of the invention 
is critical to the inventor, the patent attorney, the examiner at the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, the holder of the issued patent, the competitor, and the courts); 
Golden, supra note 6, at 322. 
105 See Nard, supra note 1, at 40–41 (stating that patent claims provide a 
boundary that competitors attempt to design around); see also Cotropia, supra note 
104, at 63 (noting, in addition to competitors, that patents provide important 
information to potential investors or purchasers of the patented technology); Golden, 
supra note 6, at 322–23. 
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A. Conversation Between the Inventor and the Patent Office 
1. Characteristics of the Conversation 
The conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
begins when the inventor submits to the Patent Office a patent 
application, which must conform to a number of statutory 
requirements.106  While some of these constraints are formalistic, 
such as requiring payment and an oath,107 other conditions are 
more substantive.  In particular, the application must include a 
written “specification” that describes the invention in sufficient 
detail to enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention.108  
The application concludes with a list of written “claims,” which 
define the territory of exclusion by “particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.”109  The subject matter of these claims 
must meet the statutory requirements of patentability—namely, 
it must be useful, novel, and non-obvious.110
To determine if the patent application fulfills these 
requirements, a Patent Office examiner must first interpret the 
claims.
   
111  For this purpose, the examiner is to give claim terms 
their broadest reasonable construction in light of the 
specification.112
 
106 The patent application discussed in this Article is a non-provisional utility 
patent application. There are, of course, design and plant patent applications, as 
well as provisional utility patent applications, but these are not the subject of this 
Article. 
  After establishing what the claims mean, the 
examiner assesses the patentability of the invention by searching 
for prior art or known information that relates to the claims at 
107 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601.01 (8th ed., 8th rev. 2010). 
108 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). In addition to the description of the invention and 
how to make and use it, the specification also includes an abstract and often 
drawings or diagrams. 
109 See id. Claims may be independent or dependent, but each patent application 
must include at least one independent claim. Dependent claims reference a previous 
claim and incorporate all the limitations of that claim, plus one or more additional 
limitations.  
110 The requirements of patentability are specified by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility), 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), and 35 U.S.C. § 103 (non-obviousness). The requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (enablement) must also be met for a patent to be allowed. 
111 See Mullally, supra note 6, at 336. 
112 See In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 
319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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issue.113  The examiner compares the claims of the application to 
the prior art and determines which meet the patentability 
requirements—for example, the examiner determines if the 
invention is non-obvious in light of the prior art.114  If there are 
claims that do not meet the patentability requirements, the 
examiner sends the inventor a notice of rejection for those 
claims.115  The inventor can then overcome the rejection, either 
by amending the claim to narrow or clarify its scope or by 
explaining why the rejected claim of his invention is different 
from what is disclosed in the prior art.116  The process of 
examination, rejection, and amendment/argument may include 
multiple iterations,117 not unlike the back-and-forth nature of 
everyday conversation.  The result of a successful conversation is 
an issued patent.118  The entire conversation, including the 
application and all communications between the Patent Office 
and the inventor, is collected in a publicly available file known as 
the “prosecution history.”119
The conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
includes a number of “utterances.”  The originally-filed patent 
application can be considered a series of utterances—with the 
claims being of particular significance—followed by the various 
iterations of prosecution as subsequent utterances.  The inventor 
serves up the initial offer, the examiner counters, the inventor 
responds, and so forth.  At every step, each of the parties is 
conveying information to the other side with the intent of 
 
 
113 See Cotropia, supra note 104, at 62. 
114 See id.  
115 See Mullally, supra note 6, at 348. 
116 See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 67 (2004). 
117 See id. at 66. 
118 Kieff, supra note 104. This notion of success is a bit subjective; for example, 
some may consider an instance where a patent does not issue because the invention 
does not warrant protection to be a success. However, taking the perspective of the 
inventor for the purposes of this Article, a successful outcome presumes the grant of 
patent protection. 
119 Prosecution histories typically include contents such as the originally filed 
application, Office Actions generated by the Patent Office, inventor responses to 
Office Actions, examiner search notes, and other data or affidavits submitted by the 
inventor. See Thomas, supra note 11. The completeness of the prosecution history as 
a record of the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office has been 
questioned. See id. at 186 (“Patent Office generation of these texts remains uneven, 
often leaving surprising gaps in the sequence of events commencing with a filed 
application and culminating in a granted patent.”). 
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reaching a compromise about the patent’s exclusionary scope.  
The entire conversation is essentially a negotiation about what 
exclusionary territory should be granted to the inventor.  The 
exclusionary territory negotiated is based exclusively on the 
claims, but the interpretation of the claims, either at the Patent 
Office during the acquisition process or in later patent 
infringement proceedings, relies on the understanding of the 
other utterances, such as the specification portion of the original 
application and the give-and-take of prosecution.  Thus, all of the 
utterances play a role in interpreting the claims.  
2. Comparison to Everyday Conversation 
The patent application conversation has much in common 
with everyday conversation.  In addition to relying on language 
and relating to a single topic,120 the patent conversation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office shares another similarity with 
everyday conversation—both generally have bilateral aspects.121  
Much of the communication during patent acquisition occurs in 
writing, but there is a back-and-forth dialog between the parties 
that allows for clarification of information.  In fact, there is even 
opportunity for verbal face-to-face, or at least telephonic, 
communication if necessary.122  A summary of the substance of 
this discussion is then added to the prosecution history and 
becomes part of the patent conversation.123
Despite the similarities, there are differences that may 
create difficulties in making the analogy between everyday 
conversation and patent conversation.  Some of these differences 
are superficial.  For example, because much of the conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office is carried out via 
written correspondence, the speaker cannot rely on extra-lingual 
clues, such as gestures or facial expressions, to provide context.
 
124
 
120 The fact that the patent conversation is written, while everyday conversation 
is most often oral, does not defeat the analogy. Writing is simply a representation of 
the same language used in oral conversation. See supra note 33. Further, the 
inclusion of technical and legal language in the patent conversation does not render 
the analogy inapt because everyday conversation may also contain technical terms 
and difficult concepts. 
  
121 Everyday conversation, of course, need not be bilateral. See supra Part I.A. 
122 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b) (2011) (setting requirements for meeting with an 
examiner); Lemley & Moore, supra note 116. 
123 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b). 
124 See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 385 (making a similar point for legal speech, 
such as statutes). 
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Further, patent conversations tend to avoid indexicals, or content 
that depends on temporal or other objective context of the 
conversation.125  For example, deadlines are stated as dates 
certain—for example, January 1, 2009—rather than “next week” 
or “by the end of the year” to avoid ambiguity.  Patent 
conversation may also include a list of definitions for certain 
terms used, something that is rarely done, and rarely required, 
for everyday conversation.126
There is an additional hurdle in analogizing the patent 
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office to 
everyday conversation, namely, the identities of the parties to the 
conversation.  In everyday conversation, the speaker and the 
hearer are generally readily identified, with the only question 
being what type of audience is hearing the conversation: 
addressee, auditor, overhearer, or eavesdropper.  Although the 
inventor and the Patent Office would seem to be the natural 
choice of parties to the conversation, communication most often 
occurs through an intermediary, a patent attorney, who 
facilitates the conversation.
  These superficial differences do not 
weaken the analogy for two reasons.  First, in various 
circumstances in everyday conversation, similar modifications 
are made.  As noted above, when speaking to children, for 
example, more direct language is used and less is left unsaid.  
Second, for the purpose of making the analogy between patents 
and everyday conversation so as to better understand patents, 
these differences are actually helpful, by creating more certainty 
and less ambiguity than is generally present in everyday 
conversation. 
127
 
125 See id. at 381–82. One area of pragmatics is concerned with how the facts of 
the conversation are relevant to meaning. Indexicals fall under the purview and 
include terms such as “I,” “now,” “today,” and “here.” Interpretation of these terms 
relies on objective data about the conversation itself. In the case of “I,” it depends on 
who is speaking; in the case of “now” or “today,” it depends on the time or date of the 
utterance; and finally, in the case of “here,” it depends on where the utterance is 
made. See id.; see also Marmor, supra note 10, at 425.  
  The addition of the patent 
attorney to the inventor’s side of the conversation raises a 
question about the extent of the parties’ shared background 
126 In part, this is because patentees are allowed to use words as they see fit, so 
long as they denote when they are using the words for other than the ordinary and 
customary meanings. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“[I]nventors may act as their own lexicographers and give a specialized 
definition of claim terms.”).  
127 See Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
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knowledge; although the patent attorney may look like a simple 
conduit, the reality is that the patent attorney’s role is not so 
transparent.128  The patent attorney is not truly a party to the 
conversation because his intent is simply to assist with the 
conveyance of information; however, he is more than simply a 
mouthpiece because he may distill technical information from the 
inventor, interpret information received from the Patent Office, 
and even add legal and technical information and arguments to 
the conversation while communicating, on the inventor’s behalf, 
with the Patent Office.129
Similarly, other realities of patent prosecution bring up 
questions of collective action, a concern influencing both the 
parties’ shared background knowledge and the speaker’s intent.  
On the inventor side, although the identity of the inventor 
generally remains constant throughout the conversation, the 
patent attorney working on the inventor’s behalf may vary.  In 
part, this may be due to the lengthy nature of patent prosecution; 
one attorney may help the inventor draft the original patent 
application, but another attorney may assist with the give-and-
take of prosecution that occurs anywhere from six months to 
several years later.
  This hurdle does not render the 
analogy between patent conversation and everyday conversation 
moot; rather, it simply requires us to reflect these differences 
when developing conversational maxims. 
130
 
128 Although courts initially, and wrongly, believed that patent attorneys were 
acting as mere conduits between the inventor and the Patent Office, see, e.g., Jack 
Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970), this view has 
generally shifted. Instead, the “conduit” role of the patent attorney has been called 
an “inaccurate, and uninformed characterization of the patent attorney’s role in the 
preparation and prosecution of a patent application.” Knogo Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. at 
940.  
  The changing of the attorney responsible 
for prosecution may be due to attorney attrition, dynamics of law 
firm practice, or simply because the original attorney is busy 
129 For these reasons, at least one scholar has proposed that claims be construed 
not from the point of view of the PHOSITA but rather from the perspective of a 
patent attorney. See Golden, supra note 6. 
130 Lengthy patent pendency is a well-known problem at the Patent Office. In 
fiscal year 2007, the average time from filing to first office action—the first 
communication from the Patent Office to the inventor in the prosecution process—
was 25.3 months. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007 tbl.4, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/50304_table4.html. The average 
total pendency, from filing to either allowance or final rejection, was 31.9 months. 
See id. 
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with another project when a response to a communication from 
the Patent Office is due.  In the same manner, the lengthy nature 
of prosecution, coupled with significant examiner attrition rates, 
also raises the possibility that different patent examiners may be 
involved at various stages during the conversation.131  These 
personnel changes on both sides make it difficult to ascertain the 
parties’ shared background knowledge because as the parties 
change, so do their backgrounds.  The revolving door of parties 
also makes it difficult to consider the intent of the speakers, 
because it is difficult to ascribe identical intent to different 
parties.132
The most substantial difference, however, between everyday 
conversation and this patent conversation is that the 
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office is fully 
strategic.  Each party has different incentives driving its 
participation in the conversation,
  Yet, the parallels between everyday conversation and 
patent conversation exist regardless of this difference; the 
differences can be addressed by modifying the conversational 
implicature applied. 
133
 
131 The Patent Office has a troubling examiner attrition rate, particularly in the 
pool of examiners that have direct responsibility for communicating with inventors. 
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT 
APPLICATION BACKLOG 1 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d071102.pdf (“From 2002 through 2006, one patent examiner left USPTO for nearly 
every two the agency hired. This represents a significant loss to the agency because 
70 percent of those who left had been at the agency for less than 5 years and new 
patent examiners are primarily responsible for the actions that remove applications 
from the backlog.”). 
 rendering the 
communication non-cooperative.  Everyday conversation 
132 This problem may be exacerbated because later amendments and arguments 
made by subsequent attorneys will more likely be responsive to Office actions or be 
based on previous amendments and arguments without regard to the specification. 
The specification, which originally served as a vehicle for containing at least some of 
the shared background information between the parties to the conversation, becomes 
less primary as prosecution goes on. 
133 This is also true for statutory conversation. See Philip P. Frickey, Faithful 
Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1086 (1995) (“[T]he law is attempting to 
accomplish two rather contradictory things. It is attempting, first, to communicate 
duties to the citizenry in general, and to officials in particular, a use of language 
perhaps substantially captured in the linguist’s focus on conventional 
understandings. Simultaneously, the law seeks to channel the discretion of 
enforcement officers and judges to maximize justice in widely divergent 
circumstances. Accordingly, the law superimposes on ordinary meaning all manner 
of canons of interpretation, maxims, and exceptions (e.g., purpose trumps plain 
meaning; avoid absurd results).”). 
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presupposes that the speaker is “mak[ing] a relevant 
contribution to the conversation, given the stage in which the 
conversation is, and the prior background knowledge of the 
relevant parties.”134  Unlike everyday conversation, where 
cooperation is presumed because the speaker wants to convey 
information clearly and the hearer wants to receive information, 
patent conversation is different.  Neither the inventor nor the 
Patent Office is aiming to create certainty of understanding 
between the parties,135
The goal of the inventor is naturally to obtain as much 
exclusive territory as possible.
 a goal at the heart of cooperative 
communication.  
136  One way to achieve this goal is 
to submit overly broad claims to the Patent Office.137  Although 
the patent prosecution system was designed to be interactive, 
allowing an inventor to narrow the scope of the patent’s claims in 
response to rejections issued by the examiner,138 the reality is 
that patent examiners may not have the time or motivation to 
cabin in the scope of the claims perfectly.139
 
134 See Marmor, supra note 10, at 429. 
  Further, instead of 
expressly explaining what the claim language means, the 
applicant most often discusses his invention in terms of the prior 
art by describing the other inventions that exist and then 
135 See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180–81 (2007). 
136 Other scholars have recognized the strategic nature of the inventor’s 
behavior in this conversation. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent 
Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 215–16 (2002)  
[T]he patentee has both the motive and the opportunity to behave 
strategically. Such behavior can take many forms. It might involve 
declining to conduct a thorough prior art search, thus transferring this cost 
to the public as well as increasing the possibility that the [Patent Office] 
will ‘miss something’ and allow the unwarranted scope. Perhaps a patentee 
will draw inappropriately broad claims, hoping that the prosecution process 
will only minimally (if at all) pare the claims back, thus yielding additional 
scope. Perhaps a patentee will vaguely describe her invention in the claims 
or (sic) in order to introduce uncertainty about the scope of her patent. 
Id. 
137 To be fair, there are other reasons why an inventor may submit broad or 
imprecise claims; he, or his patent attorney, may not write well, may not have 
resources to permit a more carefully drafted application, or simply may not know the 
scope of the prior art. See id. at 199–200. 
138 See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 
F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that patent prosecution is intended to remove 
uncertainties of claim scope). 
139 See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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explaining, often in boilerplate, that the prior art does not teach 
or disclose his invention.  While strategic conduct to obtain a 
broad expanse of exclusionary territory drives this behavior in 
part, it is also a function of the patent acquisition process, as the 
applicant often makes these statements in response to the 
examiner’s rejections based on prior art.140
Another means to achieve broad exclusionary territory is to 
submit imprecise claims to the Patent Office and to be only as 
specific as necessary to get the patent application allowed.
   
141  
Any vagueness that remains in the issued patent will permit the 
patent holder to argue for a broader scope in any subsequent 
infringement suit.142
On the other side of the conversation, the goal of examiners 
at the Patent Office is to issue valid patents.
  The strategic nature of the inventor’s side 
of the conversation does create some difficulty in making the 
everyday conversation analogy, but is not fatal because the 
maxims used for everyday conversation can be modified to reflect 
this difference, as discussed below.  Indeed, as we will see, it is 
this difference that reveals what linguistics really has to offer 
patent law. 
143
 
140 See, e.g., Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel 
Defense to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A 
Bridge or the Troubled Waters, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 208, 215 (2007) 
(noting that an applicant who distinguishes his invention over the prior art is 
necessarily indicating what the claims do not cover, rather than what they do). 
  But this does not 
mean that the examiner is seeking to create certainty of 
understanding either.  If the claims appear valid on their face, 
141 See Wagner, supra note 136, at 188. 
142 See id. at 188, 215–16; see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and 
Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim 
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 210–11 (2001). 
143 See, e.g., David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a 
Limitation on the Duty of Patent Practitioners To Advocate for Maximum Patent 
Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 222 (2002) (“It is widely agreed that quality is a 
significant goal of patent prosecution. Government, industry, academia and the 
patent bar alike have long insisted that the USPTO approve only those patent 
applications that describe and claim a patentable advance. Quality patents are, in 
short, valid patents.”).  
 However, at the individual patent examiner level, it is doubtful whether the goal 
is even issuing valid patents. Rather, examiners receive “counts” for certain 
activities, such as allowing patent applications or finally rejecting patent 
applications. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 131, at 7. 
An examiner has a production goal of a certain number of “counts” he is expected to 
earn. See id. Thus, an individual examiner’s goal may have very little to do with 
issuing valid patents and nothing to do with creating certainty of claim scope. 
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the examiners have no motivation to seek clarification of terms 
used in the patent application.144  The examiner, as a surrogate 
for the PHOSITA, may believe he shares an understanding of the 
terms and thus does not seek clarification.145  Even when the 
examiner rejects a claim, he generally does not participate in the 
conversation by suggesting an amendment or proposing a 
solution for crafting a patentable claim.146  Moreover, because 
examiners are rarely, if ever, required to testify in patent 
infringement proceedings, their interpretation of the claim terms 
is not subject to scrutiny, further decreasing incentives.147
Because communication between the inventor and the 
Patent Office is driven by these separate goals, this patent 
conversation is not cooperative.  Yet, unlike other non-
cooperative conversations,
   
148
 
144 See Risch, supra note 135. 
 the non-cooperative nature of this 
patent conversation does not incent the speaker to include 
greater information in the utterance itself; rather, to achieve the 
broadest exclusionary territory, it is often in the inventor’s best 
interest to omit information.  And the examiner is under no 
obligation to seek the omitted information, so long as he can 
perform his task with the information at hand.  While fear of 
sub-optimal communication may cause a rational speaker in 
everyday communication to leave little for contextual 
145 See id. at 200–01. 
146 See id. at 195 (“The examiner does not usually suggest or require modified 
language as part of a rejection. Instead, the applicant must determine what 
corrective action should be taken, if any, in order for the patent to issue, and this 
may not yield precise claims.”). 
147 See id. at 180–81. 
148 In other non-cooperative conversations, such as legal statutes, the speaker is 
more likely to include a greater amount of information in the utterance itself and 
less likely to leave much for contextual interpretation out of concern that the hearer 
will arrive at a contradictory interpretation or will find unintended loopholes. See 
McGreal, supra note 18, at 347 (“When a receiver of a message is not cooperative but 
adversarial, all of this missing information [i.e., the context] must be stated 
explicitly, which is why we have the tortuous language of legal contracts with their 
‘party of the first part’ and ‘all rights under said copyright and all renewals thereof 
subject to the terms of this Agreement.’ ” (quoting PINKER, supra note 18, at 228–
29)); id. at 326 (“[O]rdinary speech depends heavily on shared context. And that is 
precisely why ordinary conversation is not part of the legal drafter’s tool kit. . . . The 
more [a lawyer] leaves to context—the unspoken assumptions supplied by the 
reader—the more the drafter risks later manipulation of her work product. 
Specifically, she risks that the reader will apply a different context. . . . This leads 
the legal drafter to write into text information that an ordinary speaker would leave 
to context.”). 
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interpretation, the inventor speaker often relies on the 
information asymmetry caused by sub-optimal communication to 
generate sufficient ambiguity for him to claim a greater scope of 
exclusion during enforcement proceedings.149
Everyday conversation and the patent conversation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office share many similarities, and 
the differences between them, while necessitating some 
adjustment, do not render the applicability of conversational 
implicature inappropriate.  In fact, some of the differences 
between everyday conversation and patent conversation actually 
yield a more certain understanding in patents.  In any case, there 
is enough traction that the devices we use when understanding 
everyday conversation can be applied to claim construction.  And 
further, it becomes clear that the non-cooperative nature of this 
conversation may underlie many of the perceived problems with 
claim construction.  This insight is the greatest benefit of looking 
at patent law through a pragmatics lens. 
  Still, the analogy to 
everyday conversation is valid, albeit with some modifications. 
With that we turn to the conversation between the patent 
and the public, which shares many similarities with everyday 
conversation, as well as many of the same differences as the 
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office. 
B. Conversations Between the Patent and the Public 
1. Characteristics of this Conversation 
Conversations between the patent and the public can take 
many different forms, although the communication is always 
unilateral.  Whatever structure the conversation takes, the ideal 
end result should always be “successful communication, by the 
patentee to the world, of the scope of the patentee’s right to  
 
 
 
 
149 See Miller, supra note 11, at 184–85 (“Patentees, who are responsible for the 
text in their claims, can choose words of greater or lesser generality to define their 
inventions. . . . After all, if claim text does not help confine claim scope, claims are 
not worth the trouble it takes to write them. On the other hand, if a patent’s power 
to exclude reached no further than its claim’s literal terms, patent protection would 
unfairly ‘place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism’ and thus, too weak to attract 
investments in innovation, would fail of its essential purpose.”). 
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exclude.”150  Thus, the information conveyed by the patent 
document during these conversations is quite important—it 
delimits the exclusionary territory of the patent holder.151
The most visible manifestation of this conversation is in the 
infringement litigation scenario.  A court will look to the patent 
to determine the patent holder’s territory of exclusion and 
interpret the meaning of patent claim terms to clarify the 
boundaries of this territory for a particular purpose.
   
152  If an 
accused infringer’s product or process falls within those 
boundaries, then the infringer is liable for infringement and may 
be enjoined from using the invention and/or required to pay 
damages.153  When interpreting the patent, the court is to give 
claim terms the “ordinary and customary meaning” that would be 
given to them by a PHOSITA.154  In doing so, the court should 
look to the words of the claim itself, as well as to the patent 
specification and the prosecution history, for context.155  If the 
meaning of the claim term is unascertainable after reviewing 
these sources, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as 
expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises.156
 
150 See id. at 189 n.62. 
 
151 In this Section, the right-holding party is identified as the patent holder or 
patentee, rather than the inventor, as denoted in the previous Section. This is a 
subtle point; patent applications in the United States must be filed in the name of 
the inventors. However, most patents are assigned by the inventors to a corporation 
or other organization. It is the assignee, or patent holder, that has the ability to 
enforce the patent rights. 
152 See Cotropia, supra note 104, at 74–76. 
153 See Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent 
Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 503–04 (2010). 
154 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see 
also Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of invention through whose eyes 
the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the 
patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have 
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field. The inventor’s words that 
are used to describe the invention—the inventor’s lexicography—must be understood 
and interpreted by the court as they would be understood and interpreted by a 
person in that field of technology.”). 
155 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(noting that intrinsic evidence—the claims, specification, and prosecution history of 
the patent—are more reliable than extrinsic sources and should be turned to first in 
claim construction). But see Thomas, supra note 11, at 193 (arguing that prosecution 
histories are generally disjointed and incomplete and should not be considered 
intrinsic evidence for the purposes of claim construction). 
156 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (noting that extrinsic evidence—expert 
testimony, dictionaries, and treatises—are helpful but “less significant than the 
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But the patent also conveys information outside of the 
courtroom.  The means by which it does so are less clear, but 
competitors look to a patent to determine what territory to avoid, 
potential purchasers of a patent look to the patent to determine 
what territory is protected to determine its value, and potential 
investors look to a patent to determine whether the protected 
territory is likely to yield good returns.157  Patents also signal 
other characteristics unrelated to the exclusionary scope of the 
patent, such as the technological savvy of the patent holder or 
the general “coolness” of the product embodied by the patent.158
There are a few ways to consider a patent as conversation 
with the public.  One way would be to consider the entire patent 
document as an utterance.  An alternative way would be to 
consider each claim as a separate utterance, not unlike each 
provision of a statute that is interpreted on its own but in 
relation to the surrounding provisions.  Because each claim 
represents a particular exclusionary territory to be delineated, 
this Article will adopt the claim-as-utterance view of the patent 
  
In all of these cases, construction of the claim terms may be less 
precise and less deliberate, but the import of the information 
conveyed by the patent claims is still great. 
 
intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language’ ” 
(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
In no case may the extrinsic evidence “be used to vary or contradict the claim 
language.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584. 
157 Cotropia, supra note 104. 
158 Consumers are not actual parties to the conversation, in that they do not 
typically read the patent document. Rather, they are influenced by the presence of 
the conversation—that a patent exists means that the patented product has certain 
qualities. While this is not necessarily true, there is evidence that consumers hold 
this belief. In this way, the consumer and others may be viewed as perhaps an 
overhearer to the conversation. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: 
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 732 
(2004) (noting that patents are used “to bolster one’s image among consumers as an 
industry leader,” as well as to serve as collateral for loans, publicize information 
about research and development to competitors and investors, and to track 
productivity of employees). 
 Patents may perform a less than laudable signaling function, normatively 
approving as a social benefit something that is otherwise objectionable. See Shubha 
Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 
56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 449 (2008) (arguing that awarding patents including racial 
categorization sanctions racial stereotypes); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive 
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 581 (2006) (arguing that granting 
patents on genes related to characteristics such as sexual orientation, deafness, or 
dwarfism communicates a governmental approval that these characteristics are 
pathological and should be remedied). 
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as conversation.  However, simply adopting the claim-as-
utterance view does not render the specification or other claims 
irrelevant; rather, just like in everyday conversation, the content 
of each utterance is influenced by what else is spoken during the 
same conversation. 
2. Comparison to Everyday Conversation 
Just like with the conversation between the inventor and the 
Patent Office, the conversation between the patent and the 
public shares many similarities with everyday conversation.  
This conversation relies on language to convey information and is 
concerned with a single topic or invention, but unlike everyday 
conversation, it is unilateral; the public does not have the 
opportunity to reply to the patent or seek clarification during the 
conversation.  Unlike everyday conversation, the conversation 
between the patent and the public has no oral voice; any 
communication is performed exclusively via the written 
document.  And because this patent conversation is unilateral 
and limited to the written word, there are generally fewer 
indexicals, such as “next week,” and other objective contextual 
components.  Similarly, because the conversation is unilateral 
and written, as well as being quite formal, it is often more 
complete than everyday conversation, with more information 
being expressly stated by the speaker and less left to 
interpretation by the hearer.   
Just like in everyday conversation, there is a level of fluency 
contemplated in patent conversations.  The speakers and hearers 
are presumed to be competent speakers of the language—not just 
the English language that the patent is written in but also the 
jargon of the underlying technical field.  This competency is 
captured by the requirement that patents be interpreted from the 
perspective of the PHOSITA, even where the interpreting party 
is someone with no technical background.159  To aid in this 
endeavor, the person construing the claim is permitted to look  
to referents—physical representations—or senses—abstract 
representations or dictionary definitions.160
 
   
 
159 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 32 (2010). 
160 See John Cordani, Note, Patent at Your Own Risk: Linguistic Fences and 
Abott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1246–47 (2010). 
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Just like the conversation between the inventor and the 
Patent Office, there are differences between this conversation 
and everyday conversation.  Because of the realities of patent 
prosecution, there is a limit to the amount of information that 
the speaker is willing and able to provide.  Thus, the 
conversation between the patent and the public is again not just 
non-cooperative; it is fully strategic.  As mentioned above, the 
inventor will attempt to craft a patent that is deliberately 
ambiguous, so as to allow the patent holder to shape the scope of 
his exclusionary territory based on the activities of his 
competitors.161  Although this uncertainty has been blamed for 
the failings of the patent system,162
In addition to the imperfections of language, the discrepancy 
of information based on strategy has other manifestations.  First, 
the patent document, the speaker in this conversation, is itself 
the product of a related non-cooperative underlying conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office.
 the ambiguity plays an 
important role precisely because of the nature of language itself.  
It is very difficult to describe an invention, particularly one 
which must be new and non-obvious, in words; the fact that 
language allows for some wiggle room makes the difficulty of 
crafting claims a bit less painful.   
163
 
161 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and 
Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 966 (2004) 
(“Lawyers being lawyers, applicants’ counsel will take advantage of wiggle room in 
the conceptual space between a prior art reference and the claims of a patent.”). 
  It is impossible to 
overstate the importance of this point.  The very conversation 
that gives rise to the patent is fraught with strategic behavior, as 
both the inventor and the Patent Office approach the 
conversation with differing goals.  The resulting patent cannot 
possibly be cooperative, complicating any interpretation of the 
terms used.  Claim construction, as it currently exists, may well 
represent the best that can be done, given linguistic limitations. 
162 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does 
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 928 (2001) (“[U]ncertainty 
in the boundaries of the patent holder’s property right. . . . will divert resources from 
innovative efforts (research and development) to enforcement (transaction or 
litigation costs), decreasing the value of the property right and thereby decreasing 
its efficacy as a means for promoting innovation.”); see also JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 235, 239 (2008). 
163 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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Second, the patent document may be intended to say 
different things to different constituents in the audience, not 
unlike the distinctions discussed above with respect to 
addressees, auditors, overhearers, and eavesdroppers.164  For 
example, while the inventor may be carving out his exclusionary 
territory for competitors, putting them in the position of 
addressees, he may be indirectly signaling technical competence 
to investors and product sophistication to consumers, where the 
consumers may be considered auditors.165  Based on the public 
nature of patents, even if the inventor is not speaking directly to 
the public, they are represented as overhearers or 
eavesdroppers.166
Third, patents typically contain at least some technical 
jargon as well as patent-specific lingo that may not be readily 
understood by different audiences.
  Because the speaker, or patent in this case, is 
intending to convey different information to each of these 
audiences, the utterance must be carefully and strategically 
crafted by the inventor and his patent attorney.   
167  Further, the fact that the 
same words and utterances used in the same patent may be 
given different meanings depending on the parties to the dialog 
may be troubling.168
 
164 See supra Part I.A. 
  But these phenomena can just as easily 
occur in everyday conversation.  A quick scan of the news 
headlines includes legal terms, such as “subpoena,” “filibuster,” 
and “conspiracy,” and scientific terms, such as “antiretroviral,”  
 
165 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 473, 503–04 (2005); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637 
(2002). 
166 Of course, given the disclosure function of patents, it would be naïve for an 
inventor to be unaware of the public’s role as an eavesdropper to this patent 
conversation. The inventor, however, may not be aware of the expressive impact of 
the patent, which may be analogized to how an eavesdropper may view the patent. 
See Smith, supra note 13. 
167 See McGreal, supra note 18, at 335 (“Linguistic communities also exist within 
groups that share a common language. For example, lawyers and other professionals 
use some words in distinct ways. These words are the group’s jargon. It is high 
praise to say that the member of a profession can explain her work to non-members 
without using jargon. To avoid jargon, the speaker must choose words with a shared 
usage among different linguistic communities (e.g., lawyers and non-lawyers).”). 
168 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 135, at 204 (arguing that the Patent Office should 
adopt the PHOSITA rule of claim construction used during litigation); see also In re 
Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the Patent Office is not bound by a district court’s claim construction because the 
rules of claim interpretation are different in each venue). 
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“nanotechnology,” and “network neutrality,” which may be easily 
understood by the legal literati or technorati but may mean 
something entirely else to the population at large. 
Regardless of the reason, the information asymmetries do 
not render the analogy between everyday conversation and this 
patent conversation inapt for two reasons: (1) some of the same 
issues arise in everyday conversation, and (2) the non-cooperative 
nature does not void the utility of this approach; rather, it 
provides an insight into linguistic limitations and suggests that 
the underlying conversation may be more important for 
improving claim construction than the interpretive process itself.  
Although some modifications may be necessary, the analogy 
between everyday conversation and each of the patent 
conversations can be justifiably made.169  All require language to 
convey information and that the parties to the conversation 
speak the same language.  In some areas where the patent 
conversations differ from everyday conversation, the difference 
may actually cause the patent conversations to include more 
information than otherwise, such as in the avoidance of 
indexicals and other context-dependent content.170
Although the correlation between patents and everyday 
conversation is not perfect, making the analogy between 
everyday conversation and patent conversations provides a 
useful framework for providing insight and instruction into how 
we can better understand the process of construing terms used in 
patent claims.  Not only are many of the terms that the courts 
construe in patent cases actually everyday words used in an 
  In other 
areas, particularly the aspect of non-cooperation, the patent 
conversations do not directly track everyday conversation; 
perhaps making patent conversations more cooperative is just 
what is needed. 
 
169 It may be argued that patent conversation is unlike everyday conversation, 
because if we understand ninety to ninety-five percent of everyday conversation, we 
will be fine. In patent conversation, however, it is that remaining five to ten percent 
that is at the center of claim construction disputes. But there are certainly 
circumstances in everyday conversation where a precise understanding of the 
information conveyed is important, even for banal exchanges such as the where and 
when of a date or what a spouse should pick up from the store on the way home. 
170 As I argue throughout this Article, the current state of patent prosecution 
invites less, not more, disclosure. When, however, it comes to concrete notions, such 
as dates, patent disclosure may actually be more complete than everyday 
conversation because, unlike everyday conversation, there is no opportunity to 
clarify these concrete notions in patent conversation.   
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ordinary, conversational way,171
III. APPLYING CONVERSATION IDEAS TO PATENT CLAIMS 
 but the conversation framework 
also has utility even for technical words.  Further, appreciation of 
the conversational aspects of patent law explicates the true 
nature of the problem underlying claim construction—non-
cooperation—and points towards an actual solution: the injection 
of cooperation into patent conversations.   
In making the analogy between patents and everyday 
conversation, the first question is how do we understand the 
language used in patent claim terms?  Just like in everyday 
conversation, the search for meaning in patent claim terms 
begins with the content or utterance itself, construing the words 
used.  Unfortunately, in the existing claim construction process, 
this is not just the starting point but also the end point.  While a 
glint of context may arise in the definition of a single particular 
word, the context provided by the overall conversation has eluded 
analysis until now.  This Section first discusses the current claim 
construction process: interpretation of the content, or utterances, 
of patent claims.  This Section then makes the case for examining 
claim construction through a pragmatics lens.  This Section 
provides the background for the final Part that contends that 
claim construction is as good as it can be, given linguistic 
limitations and that the only avenue for improvement is to make 
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
more cooperative.  But first, how are claims currently 
interpreted? 
A. Understanding Content 
The patent claims define the scope of exclusion, and so claim 
construction must begin with the words of the claim.172  The 
language chosen by the inventor is key, because “[t]he 
conventions of word meaning and syntax enable us to 
express . . . meanings with great accuracy and subtlety and the 
skilled man will ordinarily assume that the patentee has chosen 
his language accordingly.”173
 
171 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
  The task of claim construction is to 
172 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
173 Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., [2004] UKHL para. 34. 
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give the words chosen by the inventor their “ordinary and 
customary meanings” as would be given to them by a 
PHOSITA.174  In the standard claim construction process, at least 
during patent infringement proceedings,175 courts look to the 
words of the claim and then to intrinsic evidence—namely, the 
surrounding claims, the specification, the drawings, and the 
prosecution history, if in evidence—and then, if necessary, to 
extrinsic evidence, such as treatises, dictionaries, and testimony 
by experts.176  Unfortunately, this is where the existing claim 
construction methodology ends.  What is missing is context—the 
most important place to look for additional information to aid 
interpretation.  Not only is context missing from the claim 
construction process—except for its limited use in taking the 
perspective of the PHOSITA177
B. Understanding Context 
—but very little has been written 
about its application to this task. 
Although the words of the patent claim are of primary 
importance, claim construction never occurs in a vacuum—the 
“ordinary and customary meaning” must come from somewhere.  
Just as statutory interpretation has given rise to textualists and 
holistics, patent claim construction has also developed into two 
camps.178  Textualists tend to look beyond the intrinsic evidence 
only in extreme cases,179
 
174 The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and “customary 
meaning” as understood by a person of “ordinary skill” in the art when read in the 
context of the specification and prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 
F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 while holistics prefer to view all the 
175 This is not how claims are interpreted during the conversation between the 
inventor and the Patent Office. There, claim terms are given their broadest 
reasonable interpretation. See Risch, supra note 135; supra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
176 See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303. 
177 The prosecution history could also be considered context. The prosecution 
history, however, reflects the conversation between the inventor and the Patent 
Office. It is not technically context because it is the conversation itself. 
178 See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 146; Nard, supra note 1, at 4–6; R. Polk 
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2004). Wagner 
and Petherbridge actually identify three camps of judges on the Federal Circuit—
proceduralists, holistics, and swing judges. See id. But the proceduralists and 
holistics generally line up with the textualists and holistics identified above. 
179 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 178, at 1131. 
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relevant evidence.180
Although the holistics and textualists purport to look to 
context in some circumstances, it is quite limited—generally only 
dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony are considered, and 
even then only to obtain the perspective of the PHOSITA.  But 
context that leads to an enhanced understanding can also come 
from other sources, such as from the conversational aspects of 
the information exchange.  This Section describes how the 
notions of conversational implicature can work in the claim 
construction process. 
  Just like statutory interpretation, however, 
these two positions are not so different—at some point, both are 
looking for the interpretation of the PHOSITA.   
Although there are incongruities between everyday 
conversation and patent conversation, the conversation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office certainly has the potential to 
convey contextual information beyond the utterances, or words 
that are used.  Immediate application of Grice’s maxims181
The maxim of manner, as a consideration of form rather 
than substance, encourages the speaker to avoid ambiguity, 
obscurity, verbosity, and disorder.
 may 
be unsuitable because of the highly non-cooperative nature of 
this patent conversation, but with modification, the maxims 
prove quite useful. 
182  This maxim is readily 
applied to the patent conversation between the inventor and the 
Patent Office, in no small part because the form of the 
conversation is highly regulated by Patent Office rules, 
ostensibly to avoid ambiguity and disorder.  These rules impose 
at least an air of order and clarity on the patent conversation.  
Consider, for example, the Patent Office’s rules regarding 
antecedent basis.183  These rules seek to minimize ambiguity by 
compelling a degree of formality when referring to elements in a 
claim.184  Thus, the first time an element is referred to, it should 
be preceded by “a,” as in “a lever.”185  Subsequent references to 
the same lever are preceded by “the” or “said.”186
 
180 See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 150. 
  However, if two 
or more different levers have been introduced, then reference to 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 69–73. 
182 See Grice, supra note 60, at 27. 
183 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 107, § 2173.05(e).  
184 See id.  
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
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“the” or “said” lever would be inappropriate and a different 
referent, such as “the aluminum lever,” would be required.187
While the formalistic Patent Office rules, such as those 
covering antecedent basis, are helpful to avoid ambiguity in 
claims, another maxim may also be useful given the strategic 
nature of this conversation and the fact that the examiner has no 
incentive to seek clarification:  “Use words the literal meaning of 
which gets closest to what you actually mean.”
  
Although everyday conversation may not be subject to this 
explicit of a rule, following guidelines such as this lead to 
enhanced clarity in that situation as well.  
188  This maxim 
manifests itself as seeking the “ordinary and customary 
meaning” during claim construction in the conversation between 
the patent and the public, discussed below.189  Within the 
parameters of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard 
that is currently used in the conversation between the inventor 
and the Patent Office, the “ordinary and customary” meaning is 
still relevant under the guise of reasonableness.190  In any case, 
inventors are also exhorted to use the most appropriate word or 
to provide their own definition by “act[ing] as [their] own 
lexicographer.”191
The maxim of relevance, or simply “[b]e relevant,”
  This maxim, combined with the Patent Office 
rules, ideally results in a patent that is clear, orderly, and 
unambiguous. 
192
 
187 See id. 
 is 
important in the patent conversation between the inventor and 
the Patent Office as well, although it is not so easily applied.  The 
main problem is that it is not clear what exactly is, or should  
be, relevant in this patent conversation.  To the extent that 
relevance means that utterances are to be related to the 
invention at issue, this goal is regulated by Patent Office rules, 
which require that claims in patent applications be limited to a 
188 See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 392.  
189 See infra Part IV.A.  
190 Risch, supra note 135, at 180. 
191 Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of 
particular claim terms away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express 
that intent in the written description.”). 
192 See Grice, supra note 60, at 27. 
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single invention.193  However, even if the patent application 
covers a single invention, relevance is a difficult concept because 
of the realities of patent prosecution practice.  Despite the 
benefits the inventor may derive from incomplete information 
allowing for fluid claim interpretations, the inventor also has an 
incentive to throw everything but the kitchen sink into his 
specification.  This is because the inventor is allowed to amend 
and add claims during prosecution of the patent application, so 
long as the amendments introduce no “new matter” into the 
application—that is, support for any added or amended claim 
must be present in the originally filed patent application.194  
Although the claims must be supported by the specification, 
there may be content in the specification that is not relevant to 
the interpretation of the claims.195  Additionally, there may be 
information in the specification related to claims that were 
finally rejected by the Patent Office during examination.196
While some utterances in the specification may seem 
irrelevant to this patent conversation, if we limit our view to the 
claims alone, the concept of relevance is more pertinent.  Because 
claims cost money to prosecute,
 
197
 
193 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.142 (2011) (“If two or more independent and distinct 
inventions are claimed in a single application, the examiner . . . will require the 
applicant . . . to elect an invention to which the claims will be restricted. . . . Claims 
to the invention or inventions not elected, if not canceled, are nevertheless 
withdrawn from further consideration by the examiner . . . .”). 
 it can be assumed that the  
 
 
194 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the 
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 637–38 (2002). 
195 Although the inventor hedges against adding new matter by including 
seemingly extraneous information in the specification, this additional information 
may work to his disadvantage. In particular, embodiments that are disclosed in the 
specification, but are not claimed, are considered to be in the public domain. See 
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (2002) (en banc) 
(“[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this 
action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.”). Further, the inventor 
must take care in drafting the specification because subject matter may be 
surrendered if the specification is viewed as disclaiming a particular embodiment. 
See Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 
1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
196 See generally Mullally, supra note 6, at 343.  
197 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 
1521, 1531 (2005) (“Patents with more claims are more expensive to file and 
prosecute.”). 
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inventor thought each of the claims in the patent application was 
relevant, or in other words, different in some way from the other 
claims in the application. 
The remaining maxims of quantity and quality may provide 
the greatest insight into claim construction but must be modified 
before they apply to the patent conversation between the 
inventor and the Patent Office.  In the context of everyday 
conversation, the maxim of quantity states that the speaker 
should include enough information as necessary but not too much 
information or extraneous data.198  For application in the patent 
context, perhaps the maxim of quantity should be restated as 
follows:  “Make each claim cover all of the claim scope you intend 
it to, and only the claim scope you intend it to, and no more.”  
With this maxim, we can presume that each claim has a point, 
that silence is deliberate, and that the patentee is not intending 
to seek anything more than the claim states.  The problem with 
this maxim is, of course, the unfortunate necessity of the patent 
prosecution system.  When drafting the claim, the inventor is 
hedging his bets about what prior art the examiner may find, 
what his competitors are doing now and will be doing in the 
future, and what minor modifications can be made to his 
invention that he has not yet envisioned.  The inventor tries to 
draft the claims to cover as much territory as he can in order to 
capture his competitors and any minor modifications, but he is 
also trying to avoid overlap with the prior art.  Another difficulty 
is that language itself, content, is subject to various 
interpretations, so even if the inventor crafts his claims carefully 
to cover only what he intends, the conveyed information as 
interpreted by the Patent Office, and later the public, may be 
different from what the inventor intended.199
The maxim of quality also must be altered to apply to this 
patent conversation.  In everyday conversation, this maxim 
discourages the speaker from making statements he knows to be 
  These difficulties 
do not render the adapted maxim inapt but instead highlight 
how the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
would be improved with cooperation.  
 
198 See Grice, supra note 60, at 26. 
199 This phenomenon can also occur in everyday conversation, where the 
meanings of words may vary temporally or in regional usage.   
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false or for which he lacks evidence of truth.200  In the patent 
conversation, this maxim can be boiled down to the following:  
The inventor should ensure that “each claim covers only what 
you know to be true.”  However, this maxim is openly violated in 
the cases of prophetic examples and genus/species claiming, both 
of which are permitted in current practice.  In the case of 
prophetic examples, the inventor is permitted to report not just 
the results of experiments he actually performed in the course of 
invention, and thus knows to be true, but also “simulated or 
predicted test results.”201  In the case of genus/species claims, 
courts have held that although a generic description of the genus 
is insufficient to support a claim to the genus, a substantial 
number of representative species may be sufficient to obtain 
rights to the entire genus.202  That is, like in the case of prophetic 
examples, the inventor is purposely and purposefully claiming 
more than he actually knows to be true.203
While ideally we would require the inventor to only claim 
what he knows to be true, the realities of patent prosecution 
practice make this an unattractive option.  Patents are generally 
granted to the first person to file an application on the invention, 
and so there is a race to the Patent Office.
 
204
 
200 See Grice, supra note 60, at 27. To be fair, there are times in everyday 
conversation where the speaker makes statements for which he lacks evidence of 
truth, for example when making a prediction—“I think the Cubs will win the World 
Series this year!”—or voicing an opinion—“Walter Payton was the best football 
player ever.” However, in these circumstances, it is generally clear that the speaker 
is asserting for which he may not have complete evidence. 
  To be the first 
201 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 107, § 608.01; Holbrook, 
supra note 101, at 158 (noting that prophetic examples are “forms of the invention 
that the patentee did not actually invent but which would be within the scope of 
[the] disclosure”). This may cause a chilling effect on future invention where others 
might be attempting to create the prophetically claimed invention even where the 
inventor could not. See id.; see also Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the 
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 144–45 (2008). 
202 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts 
and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 (2007); Seymore, supra note 201, at 145–
46. 
203 This statement is not meant to ascribe bad intent to the inventor; generally, 
in the case of prophetic examples and genus/species claiming, the inventor is not 
purposefully misleading the Patent Office. Rather, he believes and hopes his 
statements to be true; he just does not know for sure. 
204 See Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-
Inventor-To-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008). The United 
States patent system is still a “first to invent” system, meaning that a person who 
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through the Patent Office door, the inventor must often file his 
application before he has completed every experiment he desires 
or before he maps out every species of a particular genus.  Thus, 
by abiding by the suggested maxim of quality, an inventor may 
be leaving a portion of his invention “on the table” so to speak.  
Again, rather than demonstrating that the conversation analogy 
should not be used, this information instead points to the need to 
increase the level of cooperation in the conversation between the 
inventor and the Patent Office.  Interpretation of the patent can 
thus be more consistent with how we understand everyday 
conversation. 
This conversation between the inventor and the Patent 
Office then forms the basis of the second type of conversation in 
patent law: the conversation between the resulting patent and 
the public.  The strategic nature of the first conversation, as 
highlighted above, gives rise to related difficulties in the second 
conversation, where we now turn. 
1. Conversation Between Patent and Public 
Just as with the conversation between the inventor and the 
Patent Office, the strategic aspects of the patent conversation 
between the patent and the public mean that Grice’s 
conversational maxims205 do not apply directly to interpretation 
of the patent claims.  Additionally, the utterances—that is, the 
claims of the patent—are circumscribed by the initial 
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office.  Once 
the patent has issued, the speaker—that is, the patent—has no 
leeway to make adjustments or additions to the conversation.206
 
can prove earlier invention may be granted a patent over a person who is the first to 
file. Id. However, other nations do not follow this system, instead granting the 
patent to the “first to file.” Id. In the United States, there are still reasons why the 
inventor may race to the Patent Office, including the fact that he may also be filing 
internationally, he may be disclosing the invention publicly, or he may be seeking 
investors to commercialize his invention. Id. at 1037–38. In any case, early filing of 
patent applications is the norm. Id. at 1036. 
  
The importance of this point cannot be overstated.  Based on the 
linguistic limitations on claim construction and the fact that the 
patent is fixed at the time of its issuance, the natural, and quite 
possibly only, place to fix the interpretive process is in the first 
conversation, between the inventor and the Patent Office. 
205 See supra note 69–73 and accompanying text. 
206 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2006); see also Wagner, supra note 136, at 215–16.  
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Because the patent cannot be changed after it issues, the 
critical side of the conversation between the patent and the 
public lies with the hearer.  Thus, this Section seeks to 
illuminate the hearer’s perspective of conversational context and 
illustrates that many of the guidelines for patent claim 
construction are consistent with how we understand everyday 
conversation.  In doing so, it becomes clear that claim 
construction is as good as it can get, given linguistic limitations; 
room for improvement must be found elsewhere.  But first, how 
does conversational implicature affect the understanding of the 
conversation between the patent and the public? 
The maxim of manner, namely that the speech should not be 
ambiguous or disorderly,207 is not directly applicable to the 
hearer side of the conversation; this maxim relates to the form of 
the utterance, which is crafted entirely by the first conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office.  However, a helpful 
corollary may be that the hearer should assume that the speaker 
is not being obscure, ambiguous, or verbose.  That is, the hearer 
should comprehend the speaker’s utterance as conveying its 
“ordinary and customary meaning.”208
The maxims of relation
  Interestingly, this is 
precisely the tack we take in interpreting patent claims now.  Of 
course, based on the strategy involved in the initial conversation, 
this is not necessarily easy to do, but if we strive to make the 
patent conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office 
more cooperative, then this end should work itself out.  
209 and quantity210
 
207 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 align when viewing 
the hearer side of the patent conversation.  The hearer should 
believe that the speaker is conveying relevant information and as 
much, but not more, information as necessary for the content to 
be understood.  This goes beyond the idea of relevance in the first 
conversation, which is strictly enforced by the Patent Office rules 
restricting patents to a single invention.  Rather, the hearer 
must understand that what he is being told has a purpose; there 
is nothing extraneous.  This fits nicely with the already-present 
claim construction rule that the claims are to be interpreted 
based on the specification.  Again, this is something that is 
already part of the claim construction methodology. 
208 See Miller, supra note 11, at 203–04. 
209 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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The maxim of quality211 is useful in interpreting the 
conversation between the patent and the public, but it proves a 
bit difficult to work with from the hearer’s side.  In essence, the 
hearer should believe what the speaker is saying.  A more 
layered presumption of truth already exists about the utterances 
of a patent; an issued patent is presumed to be valid.212
IV. ADDING COOPERATION TO THE PATENT CONVERSATIONS 
  
Typically, however, we view this validity as relating to the 
requirements for patentability.  But if the requirements of 
patentability are met, it can be extrapolated that the utterance 
itself is true.  Further, if we strive to make the conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office more cooperative, the 
credibility of patent utterances should improve.  Detailed in the 
following Section are the relationship between current claim 
construction methodology and the maxims derived above, as well 
as how we can improve claim construction by injecting a greater 
level of cooperation into the conversations. 
Claim construction is not broken.  This is something that we, 
at some level, already know but that has been largely ignored by 
the patent academy.  The claim construction methodology 
currently used is quite sound when considered, as it should be, 
through a conversational linguistic lens.  Claim construction is 
inherently restricted by linguistic limitations.  But the true 
insight that we gain by considering claim construction through 
this lens is that the means to “fixing” claim construction requires 
a change in the conversation between the inventor and the 
Patent Office.  Proposals aimed at healing what is perceived as 
the latest ills are missing the point; improvement can only come 
through increasing the level of cooperation in the conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office. 
A. Claim Construction Methodology Is Not Broken 
Although current claim construction procedures are 
routinely condemned by scholars, practitioners, and even district 
court judges, the criticisms are misplaced.  But present claim 
construction methodology, as it occurs during the conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office, as well as between 
 
211 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
212 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
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the patent and the public, accords with how we understand 
everyday conversation.  To be sure, claim construction is 
troubled—but we are doing the best we can, given the inherent 
limitations of linguistic expression.213
Oddly enough, this is precisely what we do now when 
interpreting patent claims.  The standard rule for claim 
construction is to give words their ordinary and customary 
meanings, consistent with the specification.
  This comment may seem 
controversial, or even heretical.  But if we were to wipe the slate 
clean and start over, knowing only what we know about everyday 
conversation, how exactly would we shape claim construction?  
We would give words their ordinary and customary meanings.  
The ordinary and customary meaning would be based on the 
shared knowledge of the parties to the conversation.  This is 
simply what we do in everyday conversation.   
214
 
213 With respect to the most disturbing aspect of claim construction, namely the 
significant amount of uncertainty that exists in part based on the extraordinary 
percentage of reversals of claim construction rulings on appeal, the answer might be 
as simple as something we know from everyday conversation. See Schwartz, supra 
note 6, at 248–49 (finding that 29.7% of appeals from 1996 to 2007 resulted in 
reversal, vacatur, or remand due to an erroneous claim construction); Thomas Chen, 
Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1165, 1177 (2008) (noting reversal rates around thirty to thirty-five percent). 
Oftentimes there is more than one right definition. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 7, at 56 (noting the “inherent indeterminacy of patent claims”); Chen, supra 
(stating that “claim construction is an inherently indeterminate process with no 
single correct answer but rather multiple reasonable interpretations”). There is also 
empirical support for this point. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 258–60 (concluding 
that claim construction is inherently indeterminate based on an empirical study that 
shows judges’ claim construction reversal rates do not improve with the number of 
claim construction cases they issue that are appealed). 
  The specification 
represents one aspect of the shared background knowledge—
shared because it is expressly provided to give context to the 
conversation.  Further, the claim construction inquiry takes into 
account an additional level of shared background knowledge by  
 
 
 
 
214 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (“[T]he words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary 
meaning.’ ” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996))). 
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considering the perspective of the PHOSITA in interpretation.215
But that is not all.  A number of the claim construction 
canons that exist also find traction in contextual linguistics and 
conversational implicature discussed above.  As with other areas 
of law, these canons are not formalistic and are simply 
guidelines.
  
The process we follow for claim construction is solidly based on 
linguistic principles for understanding everyday conversation. 
216  And the canons have been given short shrift in 
patent law generally.217  However, these canons do provide 
valuable evidence of how the maxims are already in play in claim 
construction and demonstrate again that existing claim 
construction is not that bad.  Take, for example, the canon that 
states that there is a preference for interpreting a claim to 
maintain its validity if possible.218
Another canon states that an interpretation that excludes 
the preferred embodiment of the invention is rarely, if ever, 
correct.
  This canon reflects the maxim 
of quality; the patent is presumed to be valid and the utterance is 
presumed to be true.  To instead choose a construction that 
renders the patent invalid would make the utterance false. 
219
 
215 See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 100, at 883 (noting that the ordinary 
meaning is the definition that would be given to the term by the PHOSITA). 
However, the meaning given to a term by a PHOSITA can change over time, either 
because the level of skill of the PHOSITA changes in a given field or because the 
words come to have different meanings. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing 
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005). Additionally, 
there is some skepticism about whether the courts truly consider the perspective of 
the PHOSITA in claim construction. See id. at 113 (noting that courts consider the 
PHOSITA “[i]n theory”). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent 
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (arguing that the 
PHOSITA standard is misapplied, as well as difficult to apply). 
  This reflects the maxims of quality and quantity.  As 
to quality, the hearer presumes the utterance to be true; if the 
216 See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 144 (noting that cannons aid courts in 
ameliorating the inherent tension between goals of predictability and fairness in 
claim construction cases). 
217 See Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391 (2007) (“[C]ourts and commentators have paid less attention 
to the canons of claim construction.”). 
218 See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“Claims amenable to more than one construction should, when it is 
reasonably possible to do so, be construed to preserve their validity.” (citing Modine 
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 
1617 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Carman Indus. Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
219 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 
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specification indicates a preferred embodiment, but the claims do 
not include that preferred embodiment, then the credibility of the 
utterance is put at issue.  As to quantity, if the preferred 
embodiment is not part of the claims, then the speaker has 
included extraneous information. 
Yet another canon states that if a claim supports both a 
broad and a narrow interpretation, the narrow construction 
should prevail.220  Not only does the narrower interpretation 
better serve the notice function of patent law,221
As a final example, consider the canon of claim 
differentiation, which states that “no two claims in the same 
patent should be interpreted to have the same scope.”
 this canon can be 
imposed to incent a more cooperative conversation between the 
inventor and the Patent Office, as discussed below.  Further, 
with respect to the conversation between the patent and the 
public, the narrower construction is a better choice than a 
broader construction because the narrow one is more likely to fall 
within the overlap of the shared background knowledge of the 
parties.  The preference for the narrower construction also 
reflects the maxims of quantity and relevance.  If the speaker is 
conveying only so much information as necessary to understand 
the utterance, then the narrow construction makes more sense.  
To support the broader construction, it is likely more information 
would be necessary. 
222  This 
canon reflects the maxim of manner—speech should not be 
verbose, ambiguous, or repetitive.223  Other canons incorporate 
the same notion, such as the canon that a term used repeatedly 
should be given the same definition throughout.224
 
220 See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower 
meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the 
applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider 
the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower 
meaning.”). 
  To give the 
same word in the same patent a different meaning for various 
instances of the word would be ambiguous. 
221 See Risch, supra note 135, at 214–15. Of course, a narrower definition is not 
always a more definite meaning. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1583 (Nies, J., 
concurring) (“Narrowness can not be equated with definiteness.”). 
222 Lemley, supra note 217, at 1389. 
223 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
224 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988). 
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When we look at current claim construction methodology 
through a linguistics lens, the process does not seem nearly as 
broken as commentators would have us believe.  What we need to 
do instead is reframe how we think about patent conversations 
and realize that we can learn a lot from how we comprehend 
everyday conversation.  When we do this, it becomes clear that 
much of the current claim construction methodology is not only 
soundly based in linguistics—the study of how we comprehend 
language—but also limited by linguistics in an unavoidable way.  
It is this basic idea, not any “magic formula or catechism,”225
B. Cooperative Prosecution To Improve Claim Construction 
 that 
should shape our claim construction discussions going forward.   
There remains, however, the fact that claim construction is 
indeterminate, with appellate reversals seemingly being resolved 
by coin flip.  Rather than taking aim at claim construction by 
imposing more layers of analysis or proposing greater deference, 
we should return to the linguistics framework, and in particular 
conversational linguistics, to determine if there are areas where 
everyday conversation and patent conversation can be more 
aligned.  The area of greatest difference between everyday 
conversation and patent conversation—the presence, or absence, 
of cooperation—is also the area where changes are mostly likely 
to reap tangible results.   
What would cooperative patent prosecution look like?  
Ideally, very much like everyday conversation.  The inventor 
would begin the conversation with the intent to communicate 
relevant information to the Patent Office with sufficient 
specificity to be clearly understood, given the parties’ shared 
backgrounds.  The Patent Office would be interested in receiving 
the information and would participate by seeking clarification for 
any ambiguous or vague statements made by the inventor.  The 
back-and-forth discussion between the inventor and the Patent 
Office would have the unitary goal of reaching a particular 
understanding for both parties.  The resulting patent that issues 
after the initial conversation would be the product of a 
cooperative enterprise.  A patent should reflect the clarifications 
that were made during the conversation between the inventor 
and the Patent Office, as well as convey their shared background 
 
225 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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to the public, who, acting as overhearers or eavesdroppers, may 
not have the benefit of sharing the same background on their 
own.  Between explicitly providing some shared background and 
crafting the patent document from a conversation intended to 
create clarity, the resulting patent document should be much 
more easily construed using our current claim construction 
methodology. 
The only question that remains is how to make patent 
prosecution more cooperative.  There are at least three primary 
means to inject a level of cooperation into the conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office.  First, both the 
inventor and the Patent Office must be given incentives to avoid 
strategic behavior in favor of cooperation.  These incentives can 
take the form of advantages gained by behaving cooperatively, 
carrots, or disadvantages for failing to act cooperatively, sticks.  
Both can be used to make patent prosecution a collaborative 
effort.  Second, the entire process of patent acquisition and 
enforcement needs to be imbued with an air of cooperation, 
created by removing or altering rules that would impede 
collaborative behavior.  Third, although not specifically related to 
injecting cooperation, the shared background knowledge of the 
inventor and the Patent Office in the initial conversation needs 
to be made part of the second conversation between the patent 
and the public, specifically, by institutionalizing the idea of the 
PHOSITA.  Through these proposals, we can arrive at more 
cooperative patent prosecution, ultimately yielding better claim 
construction results. 
1. Provide Incentives for Cooperative Prosecution 
Creating cooperative patent prosecution must begin with the 
initial conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office.  
The general principle of cooperative conversation requires the 
speaker to speak clearly with the intent of communicating 
information to the hearer.  Ideally, the hearer understands the 
communication based on the words uttered in light of the parties’ 
shared background knowledge or else seeks clarification.  The 
reality of the patent prosecution process, however, in fact 
discourages cooperation.  The inventor behaves strategically to 
hopefully obtain a greater scope of exclusion; the Patent Office  
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maintains, at best, a laissez faire approach to the conversation.  
Both sides are fully entrenched in their positions, and so it will 
take incentives to motivate a change to cooperative behavior. 
a. Incentives for the Inventor 
Currently, the inventor is not speaking clearly with the 
intent of communicating information to the Patent Office.  
Rather, the opposite is true.  More often than not, the inventor 
submits ambiguous or vague claims with hopes that later 
interpretation of the claims will provide broader coverage or at 
least a little wiggle room.  We must do more to encourage the 
inventor to draft clear claims.  Already, the inventor is exhorted 
to use claim terms as they would be readily interpreted by one of 
skill in the art.226  We expect that the inventor is choosing and 
using words in their ordinary and customary way, unless he tells 
us otherwise.227
We can alleviate the inventor’s belief that he must submit 
vague and ambiguous claims by instilling the patent acquisition 
and enforcement processes with an air of cooperation, as 
described below.  But we can also force the inventor’s hand by 
making these claims less advantageous.  The inventor has the 
benefit and the burden of drafting his claims.
  But our exhortations fall on deaf ears and our 
expectations are thwarted because the inventor feels the need to 
game the system. 
228
 
226 See Risch, supra note 135, at 180. Risch argues that one way to do this is to 
change the interpretation standard of the Patent Office from “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” to “ordinary and customary meaning,” as is used in patent 
enforcement. This Article does not take that position. See id. at 180, 184–85. 
  So far, the 
benefit aspect has been allowed to outweigh the burden.  To 
encourage the inventor to alter his behavior and draft clearer  
 
 
227 See Miller, supra note 11 (“A strong ordinary meaning default rule grounds 
patent drafting in this set of cooperative, interlocking assumptions by writer and 
reader, and thus rejects an errant patentee’s efforts to prevail against the public by 
using ordinary-seeming words in secretly self-serving ways. This default rule also 
provides another example, in legal interpretation, of Grice’s maxims of cooperative 
conversation.”). 
228 See id. at 186–87 (“In this milieu, with its normative tilt toward free 
competition, the patentee bears the burden of claiming an invention in terms the 
interested public can readily understand. Only a readily understood claim marks off 
territory sufficiently to put it under the patentee’s sole control, and not all claim 
construction errors are created equal.”). 
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claims, claims should be given their broadest reasonable 
interpretation during prosecution and the narrowest specified 
interpretation during enforcement.   
Giving the claims their broadest reasonable interpretation 
during patent prosecution encourages more cooperation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office because the parties will have 
to engage in an iterative process to narrow the scope of the 
claims to an appropriate breadth.  The back-and-forth between 
the inventor and the Patent Office is much like a conversation 
already.  Although there have been numerous proposals to 
narrow the default interpretation of patent claims at the Patent 
Office,229
On the other hand, when enforcing the issued patent during 
litigation, the patent claims should be given their narrowest 
possible reading.  Although this is a canon of claim construction, 
it, like all canons, is not necessarily followed.  However, rather 
than serving as a canon, this exhortation should be made a 
 this would actually decrease, not increase, the amount 
of conversation, and thus collaboration, between the inventor and 
the Patent Office.  Encouraging a longer dialogue during patent 
prosecution yields greater opportunities to clarify various points, 
while a shorter dialogue cuts off clarification.  Consider a 
discussion between two parties going out to dinner.  When asked 
where she would like to go, the first party responds, “I like most 
foods.”  She may say this because she truly does not care, but she 
may also be engaging in strategic behavior, perhaps to appear 
polite, to impress the other party, or to somehow use her 
vagueness to shape the conversation later, possibly thinking “you 
picked where we went to dinner, so I should get to pick the 
movie.”  The second party then participates in the conversation 
by giving the first party’s suggestion its broadest reasonable 
interpretation and proposes a restaurant or a type of food.  The 
ball is then returned to the first party to accept the suggestion or 
offer a different idea.  The conversation continues back and forth 
until an agreement is reached.  If instead the second party 
construed the first party’s answer more narrowly, they may not 
engage in this more complete discussion, resulting in a less 
developed answer. 
 
229 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 135, at 180. 
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rule.230  The purpose of this is two-fold.  First, it encourages the 
inventor to engage fully in the discussion with the Patent Office 
to obtain exclusionary scope that is clearly defined by the 
resulting patent.  Because any ambiguity will be a disadvantage 
to the patentee, in that he will not obtain the wiggle room that he 
has been granted in the past, he will be incentivized to work with 
the Patent Office in tailoring down the initially drafted claim to a 
more precisely worded and clearly focused claim.  Second, it 
forces the patent to work as a cooperative speaker.  Remember, 
in cooperative conversation, the speaker intends to clearly 
communicate information to the hearer.  If the patent is 
construed more narrowly, it is likely that it will more clearly 
communicate the patent’s effective scope, as well as the scope 
that reflects the discussion between the inventor and the Patent 
Office.231
It is possible that, rather than encouraging the inventor to 
engage in cooperative conversation during patent prosecution, 
the strategy is simply shifted to another aspect of the acquisition 
process.  Even if some strategic behavior remains on the part of 
the inventor, the fact that his words will be held against him 
should limit the amount of game playing and encourage him to 
draft better claims at the outset, as well as participate more fully 
in a cooperative bilateral conversation with the Patent Office. 
 
b. Incentives for the Patent Office 
Of course, the lack of cooperative effort rests not only on the 
part of the inventor.  As mentioned before, a patent examiner’s 
primary duty is to ascertain whether the patent claims are 
valid;232
 
230 See Miller, supra note 11, at 187 (“The patentee’s freedom of linguistic choice 
imposes, of course, a corresponding responsibility on the court system—namely to 
enforce the patentee’s word choices for the benefit of the public.”). 
 so long as the claims are valid based on his initial 
231 Another option may be to put greater teeth into the requirement under 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), paragraph 2, that claims be definite. I think, however, that 
this standard is more nebulous and less workable than imposing a strict rule that 
claim terms should be construed against the inventor. Courts have long experience 
construing contract terms against the drafter. Contra proferentem is a rule of 
construction that states “that interpretation will be preferred which is less favorable 
to the one by whom the contract was drafted.” Edwin W. Patterson, The 
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964).  
232 Risch, supra note 135 (“Patent examiners have an incentive to issue valid 
patents; since the question for examiners is whether the claims are valid, they have 
no incentive to clarify vague patents if the claims otherwise appear valid.”).  
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understanding of the claim terms, the examiner is unlikely to 
seek clarity as to what the inventor means by the terms.233  For 
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office to 
be more cooperative, we must demand more of the patent 
examiner.  In particular, as a hearer and participant in the 
conversation, the examiner must seek clarification whenever the 
inventor’s statements are not precise.  It is not enough that the 
examiner believe that he understands the claim terms based on 
the background he shares with the inventor.  Rather, he must 
insist that the terms be precisely worded or that the shared 
background be unequivocally stated.  This will occur in part with 
the cooperative conversation that will flow from the claim terms 
being given their broadest reasonable interpretation during 
prosecution.  The back-and-forth required to narrow the claim 
scope will allow the Patent Office to seek clarification of claim 
terms.  However, the examiner often rests on the background 
knowledge that is shared with the inventor and does not feel the 
need to seek clarification.234
To effectuate any change on behalf of the patent examiner, it 
will be necessary to change the performance measures for patent 
examiners, who are generally graded based on quantity, not 
quality.
  Because of this, the background 
knowledge must become explicit by institutionalizing the 
PHOSITA, as proposed below.   
235  Examiners should be given the necessary time to 
engage in a detailed conversation with the inventor, as well as be 
rewarded for these conversations as fulfilling their duties.  As the 
current director of the Patent Office is beginning to make 
changes in the examiner assessment process,236
 
233 See id. 
 making an 
alteration that would recognize the value of the communication is 
conceivable.  In any case, the communication between the 
inventor and the Patent Office must look more like bilateral 
234 See id. at 201. 
235 See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent 
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—One More 
Time, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 388 n.32 (2009). This is not the first paper to advocate 
for examiners to have more time to do a better job.    
236 See Recently Announced Changes to USPTO’s Examiner Count System Go 
into Effect, AG-IP-NEWS (Feb. 21, 2010, 7:52 GMT), http://www.ag-ip-
news.com/GetArticle.asp?Art_ID=8052&lang=en. Some of the changes involve 
rewarding examiners for quality work and allowing examiners more time to do their 
jobs. See id. 
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everyday conversation, where the hearer seeks clarification as 
necessary to understand the information conveyed by the 
speaker.   
2. Create an Atmosphere of Cooperation 
The importance of this conversation between the inventor 
and the Patent Office, both for patent acquisition and as the 
basis for the second patent conversation between the patent and 
the public, requires an emphasis on a more candid conversation, 
such that inventors are encouraged to withhold less information 
and examiners are motivated to seek greater information where 
possible, as proposed above.  To allow for and foster this more 
open conversation, a few of modifications need to be made to the 
patent prosecution system.   
a. Remove Prosecution History from Claim Construction 
Methodology 
Current claim construction methodology permits the use of 
the prosecution history—the record of the conversation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office—to be used for interpretation 
during the second conversation between the patent and the 
public.237
Certainly, open communication is stunted if the parties to 
the conversation fear that their statements will be used in a way 
that later harms them.  And while in some respects this is useful, 
because it forces parties to choose and word their arguments 
carefully, it creates a very guarded conversation.  For both the 
inventor and the Patent Office to fully participate in a 
cooperative conversation, they need to view their statements to 
each other as working towards a common goal of understanding, 
rather than as a something that will trap them later.  To be sure, 
the inventor feels the negative effects of the estoppel based on 
  While this may be useful to convey the shared 
background knowledge of different parties, such as addressees, 
overhearers, eavesdroppers, to the conversation, it also creates 
an incentive for the inventor to say less for fear of estoppel 
resulting from his statements made during the acquisition 
process.  Decreasing the prosecution history’s role in claim 
interpretation will yield a more cooperative environment for the 
dialogue between the inventor and the Patent Office. 
 
237 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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patent prosecution far more than the Patent Office, but if we give 
more attention to examiner quality, the statements the examiner 
makes during prosecution become much more public.  There is, of 
course, an argument that if both parties’ contributions to the 
patent acquisition conversation are not made public, via the use 
of prosecution history in claim construction, any strategic 
behavior of either party is left undisclosed and unseen.  Thus, 
rather than creating an atmosphere of cooperation, this proposal 
would instead result in a greater ability to remain strategic 
without scrutiny.  However, this proposal, taken in conjunction 
with the proposal to construe claims against the inventor and the 
subsequent proposal to relax the new matter prohibition, 
removes most of the incentives to behave strategically.  If the 
conversation of the inventor and the Patent Office is not later 
made public as part of the conversation between the patent and 
the public, both sides to this initial conversation will be more 
likely to engage in the detailed cooperative dialogue that will 
yield better patent claims. 
But do we not need the details of the prosecution history for 
claim construction?  No, for two reasons.  First, even the Federal 
Circuit realizes that the prosecution history yields inferior 
information about the meaning of terms in the patent claims.238
b. Relax the “New Matter” Rule 
  
Second, by relaxing the new matter rule and institutionalizing 
the PHOSITA, as proposed below, the prosecution history 
becomes nearly irrelevant to claim construction.  These changes 
would ensure that information that is necessary for claim 
construction will become more prominent and easily accessible 
and that that information be reflective not of the negotiation 
process but of the clarified terms that were the heart of the 
conversation.  In turn, we can remove prosecution history from 
the table during claim construction and allow for a more frank, 
and thus more cooperative, conversation between the inventor 
and the Patent Office.   
Coincident with removing prosecution history from claim 
construction, the prohibition against adding new matter into a 
 
238 See id. (“[B]ecause the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation 
between the [Patent Office] and the applicant, rather than the final product of that 
negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for 
claim construction purposes.”). 
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patent application should be relaxed.  The “new matter” rule 
forbids an inventor from adding material to the patent 
application once filed.239
The rule should not be completely eliminated because it 
prevents the inventor from adding completely new material after 
filing the application, allowing him to comply with the 
requirement that he possess the invention.
  While the inventor may make 
amendments to and add claims to the patent application, the 
specification is frozen at the time of filing.  Further, the 
amendments and new claims that the inventor may make are 
cabined by the information in the specification as filed.  The 
problem with this rule, interpreted strictly, is that it makes it 
quite difficult for the inventor to explain himself more fully if the 
examiner seeks clarification of a term.  Basically, any benefit 
obtained from a full and open discussion between the inventor 
and the Patent Office is prevented by the “new matter” rule. 
240
 
239 See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006). 
  But if we relax this 
prohibition to allow any clarifications to claim scope to be added 
to the patent document, with respect to both the claims and the 
specification, the initial conversation between the inventor and 
the Patent Office that ended with both sides reaching a common 
understanding as to the meaning of the language of the claims 
becomes useful.  This has two advantages over the prosecution 
history as it is currently used in claim construction.  First, 
allowing the inventor to add the clarifications directly to the 
patent document itself allows the patent to speak on its own in 
the conversation between the patent and the public.  All of the 
conversation is contained in the patent, or the speech; there is no 
need to resort to outside information.  Second, what will be added 
to the patent document is not a series of negotiations, as is the 
essence of the prosecution history but rather the final 
understanding reached.  This allows the patent document to 
reflect the cooperative nature of the underlying conversation 
between the inventor and the Patent Office.  It also allows the 
patent document to function as a cooperative speaker, intending 
to convey a clear, unambiguous message to the hearer, or the 
public.  In tandem with the removal of the prosecution history 
from claim construction methodology, the ability to add  
 
240 See id. § 112; Holbrook, supra note 101, at 127. 
CP_Osenga (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:20 PM 
2011] COOPERATIVE PATENT PROSECUTION 173 
clarification to the patent document itself should result in a more 
cooperative conversation, and ultimately in a better 
understanding of the terms in the patent claims. 
3. Institutionalize the PHOSITA 
Finally, although it is tangential to creating cooperation in 
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office, the 
knowledge of the PHOSITA should be institutionalized.  The 
PHOSITA is a proxy for the shared background knowledge of the 
parties to the conversation, or the inventor and the Patent Office.  
Even in that initial conversation, the PHOSITA is only nominally 
acknowledged; in general, the PHOSITA is only recognized as a 
reason why information can be left unstated.  However, the 
initial conversation gives rise to the patent, which “speaks” to the 
public.241  The background knowledge of the parties to this 
conversation, particularly on the public side of the equation, is 
unlikely to overlap in the same way as the background 
knowledge of the inventor ideally overlaps with the examiner.  
The public may be judges, investors, consumers, and competitors, 
each of which may or may not share any background knowledge 
with the inventor and Patent Office, represented by the patent 
itself.242
One way this could be handled is to require patents to be 
written to the level of a layperson.  However, describing new 
inventions is hard enough as it is.  A better solution would be to 
make this background knowledge more accessible.  There are two 
potential, and non-exclusive, ways this can be done.  First, 
because the most visible manifestation of the conversation 
between the patent and the public is in the course of patent 
litigation, more resources should be made available for a district 
court judge to seek expert testimony to gain an understanding of 
the technology underlying the patent.  This would give the judge, 
  Because so much conversational context relies on the 
shared background knowledge between the speaker and the 
hearer, more must be done to ensure the hearer is on the same 
level.   
 
241 It may feel awkward to consider the patent as “speaking,” particularly since 
the patent cannot have any intent to convey information. This is simply shorthand 
for the patent serving as a vehicle to convey the result of the conversation that 
occurred between the inventor and the Patent Office. 
242 Even competitors may or may not have the shared background knowledge of 
the  PHOSITA. 
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at least for a particular case, some of the shared background 
knowledge that we attribute to a PHOSITA.  Although the use of 
experts for this purpose is already sanctioned,243 this use should 
be strongly encouraged and occur in many cases, not just a few.  
Second, a more robust, but more difficult to implement, solution 
would be a systematic gathering of shared background 
information by technology.  In some industries, this may already 
exist; for example, a number of technology working groups of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (“IEEE”) have 
developed standards and white pages that define various terms 
as used in that industry.244
Finally, there is the problem of those common words—for 
example, “and,” “through,” and “a”—that inexplicably form a 
large chunk of claim terms in dispute.  I have advocated before 
for the creation of a Federal Circuit lexicon for this type of 
terms.
  Other industries, however, may not 
have such a developed lexicon.  In those industries, it would be 
important to create a knowledge database that would reflect the 
current understanding of terms used.  This database would, of 
course, need to be updated over time as technology shifts.  
Presumably, the benefits of this knowledge database would 
extend beyond its use in patent law. 
245
 
243 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. 
  These words do not necessarily reflect a shared 
background knowledge possessed by the PHOSITA but rather the 
ordinary person, since these words are typically being used in 
their ordinary conversational manner.  Although in everyday 
conversation we brush by these words without giving much 
thought to them, the more precise nature of patent claims may 
give more reasons to care more about their definitions in this 
case.  The Federal Circuit lexicon, composed of the court’s 
definitions of these everyday words, would be a proxy for the 
shared background knowledge between the inventor, the Patent 
Office, and the ordinary person.  For example, if the Federal 
Circuit has said that “about” means “nearly,” then 
institutionalizing that data via the lexicon will allow parties to 
the conversation to come to the patent conversation with the 
same background knowledge as the other participants. 
244 See, e.g., Publications & Standards, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/publications_ 
standards/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
245 See Osenga, supra note 36, at 89–92. 
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There may be, of course, other changes to the patent 
conversations that would advance their cooperative nature and, 
in doing so, allow for more linguistic notions to be used in the 
claim construction process.  A more candid conversation between 
the inventor and the Patent Office will yield a more generous 
disclosure in the patent, which should result in more determinate 
claim construction, while not requiring an overhaul to the claim 
construction process itself.  Looking at the problem through this 
new linguistic lens demonstrates where the difficulties truly 
arise and how we can make real differences. 
CONCLUSION 
As long as patent rights are verbally delineated, there will be 
inherent and inescapable ambiguity.  This Article demonstrates 
that, despite what many scholars have argued, the process of 
claim construction does not need to be fixed.  Rather, what needs 
to be modified is the underlying conversation, an insight that 
only becomes clear after viewing claim construction through a 
linguistics lens.  Claim construction is simply the process of 
understanding what is being conveyed by the language of a 
patent; understanding language is something we do every day.  
And so, it makes sense to provide a new framework for 
considering claims—as patent conversations.   
By analogizing claim construction to everyday conversation, 
we can draw on the rich literature of linguistics to help us figure 
out how to construe the words used in patent claims.  When we 
do so, we see that the process in place is actually quite sound.  
Various doctrines of claim construction make perfect sense when 
viewed through the conversational linguistics lens.   
What does need to change is not the claim construction 
process, but rather the circumstances of the conversations that 
give rise to the patent.  Cooperative conversation is much easier 
to understand; if we can create a greater air of cooperation in the 
patent acquisition process, then we can rely on conversational 
linguistics to help understand what is being conveyed.  It is not 
the claim construction process that we need to change; we need 
to reframe how we look at claim construction—that is, how we 
understand conversations in patent law—by first considering 
how these conversations come to be.  Patents can be easy.  
 
